C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

112immediate support such as the use of secure satellite communication equipment. Karremans was notvery forthcoming and insisted that the JCOs only cooperate with the commandos and not with the restof the battalion. Karremans banned them from operating independently outside the enclave borders, adecision that did nothing to improve Dutchbat’s intelligence picture. They were bound to the enclavefor their operational action. Karremans stated that the JCOs would be forced to leave the enclave if hisorder was ignored. 516The JCOs encouraged the commandos to explore ‘hot spots’ and to talk with the warringfactions, which until then they had not done for fear of compromising their neutrality. Patrolling wasimportant because it ‘allows the commander to gain an intelligence advantage over the parties to thedispute at the tactical level’. 517 Shortly after their arrival in the enclave, the JCOs soon metrepresentatives of the ABiH. Subsequent meetings were forbidden by Karremans. He had alsoprevented the JCOs from attending the regular meetings between Dutchbat liaison officers and thewarring factions. It has to be concluded that Karremans mainly considered the JCOs to be Forward AirControllers (in which position they were also used) and not so much as handy instruments forgathering intelligence. According to a British UNPROFOR officer, the JCOs were not adequately used,partly because it was an option Karremans was not inclined to consider: he refused to grant thecommander of the JCOs permission to operate outside the enclave. 518 Furthermore, there were anumber of differences of opinion between the JCOs and Karremans, and the latter restricted the scopeof their operational action considerably. 519Wieffer asserted that information was sometimes exchanged with the JCOs, but in spite of thishe always had the feeling that the JCOs, notwithstanding the fact that they were physically based withDutchbat in the enclave, were purely an intelligence organ for the British UNPROFOR commander.The JCOs were more likely to use Dutchbat as a source of information than the other way round.According to Wieffer, the JCOs sometimes set off separately, but not often. On these occasions theynipped across the enclave border to take a look somewhere, Wieffer heard later. But the JCOs did notleave the enclave often; they did not have the means to do so. Furthermore, there were mines here andthere outside the enclave. Apart from these incidental forays, the JCOs only left the enclave togetherwith the Dutchbat patrols. 520General Cees Nicolai (Chief of Staff BHC in Sarajevo) confirmed that the JCOs sometimeswent outside the enclave. Smith did not keep it secret from him, although he did not state in detailwhere they had been or what order he had given them. It could be deduced from the nature of theintelligence that he occasionally received. 521 A British intelligence officer with access to the JCO reportsconfirmed that the JCOs occasionally operated outside the enclave. 522 The JCOs reported directly toBHC, as ‘spies’ of Rose and later Smith, and had access to the Dutchbat III reports. Wieffer assumedthat there were no substantial differences between the two flows of reports. 523 In other words,Dutchbat III was ‘poor’ with respect to intelligence so that the situation differed little from that ofDutchbats I and II.What did the other units do?Other UNPROFOR units had set up a better intelligence structure. For instance, Canbat II, theCanadian battalion stationed in the enclave before Dutchbat I, had a Military Information Cell with516 Interview with A.A.L. Caris, 03/03/00 and confidential information (13).517 Pasi Välimäki, Intelligence, p. 79.518 Confidential interview (43).519 Confidential interview (49).520 Interview with E. Wieffer, 18/06/99 and confidential information (1).521 Interview with C.H. Nicolai, 11/06/99.522 Confidential interview (8).523 Interview with E. Wieffer, 07/05/01.