C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

41played an important role. For this reason, the head of the G-2 section in Sarajevo had to continue to bean American. 157The levels of intelligence at the Military Information Office in ZagrebThe absence of its own intelligence network and the lack of capabilities meant it was possible todistinguish various intelligence levels at the MIO in Zagreb. 158 First there was ‘the UN MIO’, asenvisaged by New York. As stated above, its facilities and resources were limited, which resulted in asecond level of activities, based on the links with the nations’ own intelligence services and the inputfrom them. Some staff members had direct connections with their home country, usually via the securelinks at their own embassies, or their home country had its own intelligence headquarters in the regionitself. The United States, France, Canada and the United Kingdom opted for their own NationalIntelligence Cell in Pleso, close to Zagreb. The staff of the MIO regularly exchanged intelligence withthat organization.A third level of activities was based on allied intelligence liaison relationships. This mainlymeant input from the long-established CANUKUS network, whose name is derived from the firstletters of the participating countries: Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. If an MIObriefer (who would usually be American, British or Canadian) could not answer specific questions fromJanvier or Akashi, there were always resources, which could be queried for a response. This happened(certainly in 1995) when Imint was made available to the highest policy makers in Zagreb, although thiswas not a regular occurrence.If the national authorities deemed it necessary, important intelligence was sometimes alsopassed on without a specific underlying request. According to an insider, some representatives ofWestern services took this to great lengths, and sometimes exceeded their mandates. However, they didput the importance of a properly functioning MIO first. The MIO also received much intelligencethrough the Monitoring Close Air Support Centre in Zagreb, the liaison cell for contacts betweenZagreb and the Fifth Allied Air Force of NATO in Vicenza. Only MIO staff from NATO memberstates had access to this operations centre. 159It is a stubborn myth that NATO has an independent intelligence capacity. NATO’s intelligencesection is a department that is completely dependent on the intelligence input of the member states.This was evident, for example, from the informal and indirect contacts through a national intelligenceline of the MIO with the intelligence staff in the NATO armed forces headquarters (in military terms,SHAPE) in Bergen/Mons. It had already come to the attention of MIO staff that many NATO reportswere identical to their own, even down to the choice of words. On a visit to Zagreb, NATO staffofficers praised the work of the MIO to the American Deputy G-2 Officer. They were extremelysurprised to learn that the daily reporting that they read was produced by a Non-Commissioned Officerwith the rank of sergeant, whose spelling was later checked by a captain in Zagreb.Some troop-contributing nations realized that intelligence officers were badly needed Bosnia andso they sent intelligence personnel to Bosnia themselves. UN headquarters in New York never requestedthese personnel, but once they were in the area the officers concerned were used intensively. Someonewith the appropriate security clearances could gain access to intelligence material that could not have beenused otherwise. This did occasionally give rise to bizarre situations within UNPROFOR. For instance, aCanadian peacekeeper with a NATO security clearance received American satellite photos, but he was notallowed to show them to his UN commander, because he was French. However, some are convinced thatthis must have happened before 1995.157 Interview with J.A.C. De Ruiter, 29/06/00.158 Interview with Barry Ashton, 30/05/00.159 Confidential interview (16).