C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

281would leave around 18 hours out of every 24. The satellite would then deliver two hours of footage,assuming that there were no low-hanging clouds, mist or heavy rain, as not all the satellites had infraredequipment. The dense fog and cloud cover that often shrouded the mountains of Bosnia reducedthe effectiveness of orbiting satellites. So, the executions would have had to have taken place at somepoint in these two hours, and in ideal circumstances, i.e. in broad daylight, with a full sun and noclouds, and precisely at the moment when the satellite was overhead. 1491 The fact that executionsusually took place at the edge of a wood, under trees or in a building is an additional factor whichfurther reduces the chance of satellite detection. In short, a large percentage of these two hours must besubtracted in order to establish the period during which these executions could actually have beenobserved.Even if more satellites had been targeting Eastern Bosnia it would still have been a ‘lucky shot’– all things considered – if they had photographed the executions. Obviously, there were no ‘luckyshots’, but even if there had been, it is still possible that the Bosnian Serbs took account of the capacityof the US satellites. It is easy enough to find their orbit times on the Internet. Conversely, thepossibilities of concealing objects or events from satellite reconnaissance should not be overestimated.For example, experts say that a spy satellite need not necessarily follow an exact path above a target tomake good photos. As soon as it appears above the horizon there are already enough photo options,1492even if the target is hundreds of kilometres away. That said, there will always be moments when atarget is outside a satellite’s range.There are also other problems that need to be considered. For instance, where exactly shouldthe analysts have looked? They did not know if executions had been carried out on a road to the northor the south of Srebrenica. They did not know which enlargements to make of which sectors in asweep of 40 km x 10 km. It is, moreover, extremely difficult to identify a small group of people who areabout to be executed. This takes a considerable amount of time, even for the most experienced analyst.All of this is typical of a classic intelligence problem, which also figures in other types of intelligence,namely, the intricate process of the intelligence cycle, whereby all data must first be converted intoinformation. This information frequently leads to knowledge, but such knowledge is only useful ifplaced in the right context by thorough analysis. This can be a highly time-consuming procedure inboth Satint and Sigint. Two US intelligence experts claimed that in 1995 the fastest Imint from satelliteswas ± 2 days old, provided that all the analysts worked on nothing else.The intelligence gathered from the above-mentioned satellites revealed that though satellitephotos of the whole of Bosnia and the eastern enclaves were constantly available, they definitely didnot take priority in the analysis of all the incoming Imint. There was always a satellite with near-realtimeintelligence in a good orbit above former Yugoslavia, but this had to cover the entire country. Itthen crossed Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, the rest of Iraq, Iran and the area tothe south of Iran. In the words of an American intelligence expert: ‘I’m sorry for Dutchbat, but if youtake a good look at this list, you can understand that the enclaves had absolutely no priority’. 1493 Whenone looks at the broader picture, it is hardly surprising that the photos which Albright presented to theSecurity Council turned up so late in the day. The countless number of photos and the abundance ofrumours prevented the Imint analysts from searching for evidence of the deportations and executionsuntil the start of August 1995. This matter will be returned to in Section 4.The Imagery Intelligence technology of other countries than the USWhere the importance attached by the UK, one of America’s closest allies, to Imint is concerned, it canbe said that this country was bound hand and foot to the Americans for Imint after the failure of its1491 Confidential interview (47) and James Risen, ‘Experts Warn U.S. Intelligence Help Has Limits’, Los Angeles Times,07/06/95.1492 Confidential interviews (13) and (62).1493 Confidential interview (75).