C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

132but there were UNPROFOR Military Information Summaries. A bag containing all the outgoing postfrom C Company also hung in the Operations room. The local employees also entered the weaponsroom and kitchen and so also knew much about stocks and the food situation.A Military Security official observed after the debriefing that this was particularly disturbing. Inthe light of this knowledge, it was not surprising that family members of dispatched soldiers wereapproached by Yugoslavs who knew everything about the soldier concerned. Another problem was thatall envelopes were thrown away in the wastepaper basket, which the cleaners emptied. The addresses ofthe senders were written on the envelopes. This is how it came about that the home front wasapproached with requests to smuggle money. The cleaners were also in a position to make copies ofleave lists, and in this way put together a picture of who was about to leave the enclave. No one waschecked on leaving the compound, except for some hand baggage. 624Did the arrival in the enclave of a Military Security officer with Dutchbat III mean animprovement in military security? In any case, Rave soon noticed that the Bosnian Muslims were verywell informed about the personal background of the battalion leaders. Rave knew, for example, that thedeputy commander Franken was keen on horse riding, and shortly after Dutchbat III arrived in theenclave an invitation arrived from Oric for Franken to go riding. Rave wondered how Oric had foundthis out. 625 It was also remarkable that the buildings and rooms that were in use by Dutchbat inSrebrenica and Potocari were never ‘swept’, so that it was unknown whether they contained hiddenmicrophones. Only after the summer of 1995, during the periods of IFOR and SFOR, was this done.One such ‘sweep’ did indeed uncover a microphone at the later headquarters of Dutch soldiers inBosnia. The battalion leaders operated from the office of the manager of an old flourmill. He called inoccasionally to look through his old accounts, and while he did so he locked the room forapproximately one hour. 626The Bosnian security service attempted to gather intelligence in the units. For instance, DutchUNPROFOR soldiers were sometimes questioned during ‘social patrols’ by people who probablyworked for this service. The Bosnian Muslims also attempted to gather information by other methods.One day, a local artist offering paintings appeared outside the Support Command compound fence inLukavac. In order to buy one, the Dutch had to write their name, rank, registration number and homeaddress on a list. This ‘artist’ was probably an ABiH intelligence man. 627 Rave immediately intensifiedthe military security in Srebrenica. Even before Dutchbat III arrived, there were reports that theinterpreter for the transport battalion operations officer was typing out letters in his office. This wasdefinitely against Rave’s wishes, and indeed security risks of this nature did not occur in practice duringDutchbat III. 628The floppy disk affairNevertheless, a remarkable incident still took place, brought to the attention of the NIOD by a formerofficer of the MIS/Army Intelligence and Security Department. 629 When Dutchbat departed for theNetherlands via Zagreb after the fall of Srebrenica, the equipment was left behind in the Croatiancapital. During an inspection of the vehicles, a Dutch UNPROFOR officer encountered a chaoticscene: maps, documents and personal effects were all mixed up together. They were collected, put intoa couple of large envelopes and taken away. Three members of the Military Security Bureau met theUNPROFOR officer concerned at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, and the material from the DutchbatAPCs was handed over to them.624 MoD, Archive 101 MI S/C ie , Jawad to Van Dijk, Debriefing report, 09/02/95 and Archive MIS/TCBU, Vreman to Van Dijk, Debriefing report, 09/03/95.625 Interviews with E.A. Rave, 13/12/00 and 14/12/00.626 Confidential interviews (19 ) and ( 20).627 MoD, Archive 101 MIS/ Cie , Van Jawad to Hakort, Debriefing report 101 MI S/Cie, 23/12/95.628 Confidential interview (19 ) and ( 20).629 Confidential interview (35).