C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

257equipment, planned operations, the supply of fresh troops, the order of battle, losses, new operationalplans and logistical problems.Before long, the ABiH in Eastern Bosnia needed more Sigint personnel in order to cope withthe flow of information. The VRS realized that the ABiH could intercept their messages. Pressure wasthen put on the VRS command to use crypto equipment, but apparently without much effect. TheABiH also discovered that the VRS could easily follow UNPROFOR communication traffic. It is forthis reason that the 2 nd Corps exhorted Sector North East in Tuzla on various occasions to use cryptoequipment. The intelligence officers of the Scandinavian battalion in particular were alerted to thisthreat but the UN allegedly refused to do anything about it.To convince UNPROFOR of these threats one ABiH general even carried out a test designedto elicit a response from the VRS. The ABiH sent out a false radio message about an ABiH patrol. TheScandinavian battalion sent this message on to Sarajevo whereupon the VRS responded immediatelywith shelling. 1357 This was confirmed by the British Lieutenant-Colonel C.A. Le Hardy, Intelligence andOperations Officer from Sector North East in Tuzla. He believed that there was indeed a leak in theradio transmission with Bosnia-Hercegovina Command: there was no question of securecommunication. Le Hardy claimed that the Bosnian Serbs had excellent Sigint and had come intopossession of a lot of information by eavesdropping on phone lines. 1358Later, it became increasingly difficult for the ABiH to monitor VRS communication as theBosnian Serbs were making more frequent use of better crypto equipment; in addition, sometimesimportant discussions were carried out in Romanian or Hungarian. However, the ABiH could stillfollow the traffic at brigade level and lower. Usually, the communication was carried out at set times.Sometimes the ABiH intercepted calls from senior VRS officers who complained about logistical andother problems. At that time, the ABiH still had only limited technical capabilities, a personnel shortageand no mobile interception trucks. It was also plagued by a shortage of spare parts and fuel to keep theelectricity generators running at the interception stations. 1359 The interception stations at Konjuh andOkresanica targeted the military communications of the VRS. Various witnesses at the trial of GeneralKrstic testified that these communications were followed before, during and after the fall of Srebrenica.The Electronic Warfare Unit in Konjuh focused primarily on the Drina Corps and the General Staff ofthe VRS. The 2 nd Corps of the ABiH also had its own interception station in Tuzla. 1360The ABiH encountered considerable problems with the interception of this type of radio traffic.The VRS used the Stolice Tower, which it had seized from the Bosnian Muslims, for most of theircommunications, which the ABiH was unable to disrupt. The VRS also used mainly radio links. As allthe stations and antennae were on Bosnian-Serb territory they could not be intercepted by the ABiH;these were line-of-sight radio links with a maximum point-to-point range of 50 kilometres. Anelectronic warfare unit can only intercept this type of communication if it has a ‘highly directional’antenna, which for a good interception needs to be positioned directly under the radio link as the beamtravels in a straight line from antenna to antenna and can cover anything from 100 to 1,000 channels.There were no radio links between the Stolice Tower above Srebrenica and the military nervecentre of the VJ in Tara (Serbia). That connection was maintained via Veliki Zep. At that time, theABiH did not have receivers to tap in to radio links; this equipment was not among secret weapondeliveries such as the ‘Black Flights’. However, early in the conflict the ABiH, working from Zepa, hadmanaged to destroy the tower in Veliki Zep and put it out of operation for a long time. 1361 The VRSrepaired it later during the war.1357 Confidential interview (73).1358 Interview with C.A. Le Hardy, 08/10/97.1359 Confidential information (37).1360 Overview of Court Proceedings, statements by 8 witnesses, 23/06/00 and 30/06/00, on:http:/www.un.org/icty/news/Krstic/Krstic-cp.htm.1361 John Pomfret, ‘Bosnian Muslims Flee As Serbs Seize Town’, The Washington Post, 25/07/95.