C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

15gathered, organized and analysed for players or decision-makers. 29 The consumers of the product in herdefinition are therefore not necessarily national decision-makers. Intelligence is a complete product thatcan be divided into various categories: political, military, economic, scientific, medical, technical andsociological.Some examples will help clarify this point. Political intelligence is concerned with both thedomestic and the foreign politics of a state, because developments not only on the domestic front (forexample the civil war in the former Yugoslavia), but also in the foreign sphere (political policy changes) caninfluence international relations between countries. Military intelligence is important to a state in helping itdetermine its military needs. It can also be useful in better assessing the current or future bilateral relationsbetween two or more states (for example between Serbia and Albania). Economic intelligence refers toinformation on, for example, the expansion of a country’s Gross National Product, the state of affairssurrounding the production and the prices of strategic and energy resources, or possible problems with thebalance of payments. Sociological intelligence relates mainly to relations between various communities30within a country, for example, the situation in Kosovo.Regarding the forms of intelligence, there are two elements that, strictly speaking, have nothing todo with the activities surrounding the gathering of intelligence, but are closely associated with themnonetheless: counterintelligence and covert action. Counterintelligence (CI) can best be defined as theidentification and neutralization of the threat emanating from foreign services, as well as the attempts madeto manipulate these foreign services and to use them to one’s own advantage. 31 It is a more specific formof intelligence, which also involves the gathering of information on hostile and friendly foreign services.Counterintelligence also involves the use of open and secret sources to acquire more knowledge of thestructure, working methods and operations of these services. As stated, counterintelligence can also involvethe penetration and destabilization of such foreign services. Finally, economic counterintelligence hasemerged in recent years and is attracting increasing interest. It is used to combat the theft of informationand technology by both hostile and friendly foreign powers. 32In general, covert action is concerned with secret activities intended to influence foreigngovernments, persons and organizations, or political, economic and military developments, as part of anational security policy. An important point is that a nation’s own involvement is kept strictly secret. Thereare various forms of covert action, ranging from propaganda, paramilitary or political activities that areintended to overthrow or support a given regime, to the secret support of individuals or organizations(trade unions, newspapers and political parties), secret arms supplies, economic destabilization operations,or even lethal attacks. 33 Covert action therefore mainly involves influencing and manipulating anopponent’s political policy. Strictly speaking, it is therefore not an activity that falls within the concept ofintelligence, although it can contribute to gathering intelligence and always requires substantial intelligencesupport. 34 An example of a planned covert action in the Balkans involving foreign services was the secretarms supplies to the Bosnian Muslim army, which we will return to in Chapter 4.29 Jennifer Sims, ‘What is Intelligence? Information for decision makers’, in: Godson, May & Schmitt, U.S. Intelligence at theCrossroads, p. 4.30 NA, RG 263, CIA records, Entry 27, Box 12, Max F. Millikan, ‘The Nature and Methods of Economic Intelligence’, in:Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1956), 3, pp. 3-4. Economic intelligence, incidentally, is not the same as industrial espionage!31 Roy Godson, ‘Counterintelligence: An Introduction’, in: Godson, Intelligence, pp. 1-2.32 Randall M. Fort, ‘Economic Espionage’, in: Godson, May & Schmitt, U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads, p. 182. See also:Annual Report of the Dutch National Security Service 1995, The Hague 1996, pp. 29-30. As it happens, CI is also one of the tasksof the Dutch Military Intelligence Service, but only within the confines of military establishments.33. Cf. Roy Godson, ‘Covert action: neither exceptional tool nor magic bullet’, in: Godson, May and Schmitt, U.S. Intelligenceat the Crossroads, p. 155.34 William J. Brands, ‘Intelligence and Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47 (1969) 2, p. 288.