C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

296is disputed. Like one US intelligence official claimed: Who had time to ‘fuzzy’ pictures? Thetransmission across second-rate communications paths alone degraded the resolution to nearunrecognizable. 1599 The analysis was carried out by the US Joint Analysis Center (JAC) in Molesworth.Normal imagery always went to Vicenza. In Villafranca this analyst had a direct national line to TheHague and delivered material every day. He had access to LOCE and telex for communicatingintelligence and received finished intelligence from Molesworth. He also received the reports fromVicenza. 1600Imint in the form of written reports was also made available to the UNPROFOR staff inZagreb. From 1993, the workers at the Military Information Office had regular access to U-2 Imint,none of it relating to the Safe Areas. 1601 Under General Rose, Imint from satellites was originally passedon to Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (BHC) in Sarajevo via the American deputy intelligence officer atBHC. Rose discovered from satellite photos that Sarajevo was not as isolated from the outside world asmost of the observers believed. There were more supply lines than just the tunnel under the airport.Rose enjoyed telling his staff the story of how, one morning in early 1995, he received a satellite photoof the city. There had been a fresh fall of snow and the confrontation lines and the trenches wereclearly visible. The next day Rose received another photo. No further snow had fallen during the nightand a comparison of two photos showed a total of 25 lorry tracks cutting right across the lines.Apparently, during the night, lorries had crossed the lines with the permission of the warring factions.Everybody was cashing in on Sarajevo’s ‘isolated position’. 1602An US military official for example watched how 55 tons of luxury goods, cigarettes andwomen’s clothing - not food - being lifted out of the tunnel. But senior political figures in WashingtonDC and other capitals continued to believe that Sarajevo was under some sort of medieval siege. WhenThe Deputy Commander US EUCOM, US General Chuck Boyd, told US Secretary of Defence, Perry,about the tunnel it seemed it was the first time that Perry heard about it. 1603Later, the Americans came to regard Rose as too pro-Serb, and US intelligence servicessuspected that there were Bosnian-Serb spies among his staff. This reduced the flow of Imint. Scarcelyany Imint was supplied to BHC in Sarajevo or SNE in Tuzla. The military aid to General Smith,Lieutenant Colonel Baxter, confirmed that Smith’s staff had no access to satellite photos. Smith did,however, get U-2 photos. This probably had less to do with American reluctance and more with thelack of secure connections with the Bosnian capital. Images from UAVs were not made available toBHC until August and September 1995. 1604However, General Janvier in Zagreb already had access to military-tactical Imint from UAVs inJune 1995. Imint was also shared with other officials in the Zagreb staff. The Deputy ForceCommander, the Canadian General Barry Ashton, confirmed that he received Imint on a regular basis.However, it was not shared with the Dutch Colonel H. de Jonge, who was responsible for determiningthe military targets. He pointed out that the US Deputy G-2, Commander Morgan, was concerned thathe scarcely received any Imint and could do little for UNPROFOR that way. This prompted Morgan tovisit the US embassy Zagreb every two days, where he ‘shopped around’ for more information throughsecure communication links at organizations unknown to De Jonge. 1605However, US intelligence officials claimed that the Deputy G-2 was receiving regular Imintreports from a variety of sources. This was shared with De Jonge and his staff. However, De Jongewanted actual photos, which was a much tougher nut to crack, given the sort of communications links1599 Confidential information (80).1600 Confidential interviews (31), (32) and (38).1601 Confidential interview (47).1602 Confidential interview (80).1603 Ripley, Deliberate Force, p. 92.1604 Interview James Baxter, 16/10/00.1605 Interviews Barry Ashton, 30/05/00 and J.H. de Jonge, 30/05/01.