C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

Secondly, the ABiH and the Sigint Unit of the Bosnian national security service may have beentrying to protect their sources, capabilities, methods and techniques. This is conceivable but lessplausible, given that the ABiH and the VRS knew that they were monitoring each other’scommunication. After all, most of the Sigint experts had worked for the VJ before the disintegration ofYugoslavia and each party knew that the other had the expertise.But if the protection of sources was the real reason behind the decision not to pass onintelligence to UNPROFOR, then this would lead to the highly cynical conclusion that senior Bosnianmilitary and political echelons did nothing to prevent the executions, simply in order to protect theirsources. It is therefore more likely that the Bosnians knew nothing about what actually happened untildays, weeks or months after the executions. By then, Comint efforts were too late to make anydifference to the fate of those fleeing. Perhaps the contents of these intercepts were, however,considered useful at a later date to serve the wider political interests of Bosnia.276