C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

177had total freedom of movement along the border with Serbia. The ICFY mission did not occupy allborder crossings; many of them were not monitored or were monitored by hired-in Serbian personnel.The mission itself was said to have admitted that 71 potential border crossings on the Drina were notunder their control. The Bosnian government then concluded that the mission was not in a position toexercise effective control. This would have required 1760 static observers, 310 mobile observers, 100interpreters and 80 administrative staff. Furthermore, according to the Bosnian government, themission would have to have 2 helicopters, 214 vehicles and a radar detection system for tracking lowflying aircraft.In May 1995 the number declined sharply; when the American and Canadian observers hadbeen withdrawn, Nieminen had 151 observers left. Of the 18 Border Control Points, four were closed.There were then observers from 18 countries: mainly from the EU, Norway, Russia, andCzechoslovakia. They were professional customs personnel, who operated in every sector. 910 Othercountries sent additional personnel, and in July 1995 the mission again had 185 observers who manned19 border crossings 24 hours a day. It appears from their comprehensive reports that smugglingattempts were occasionally made over the border between Serbia and Srpska via the Drina, 911 but nolarge smuggling operations were recorded. Three days before the attack on Srebrenica observers evennoted that on two occasions buses with men of compulsory service age were held up at the border bySerbian militias, and were not allowed to enter the Republika Srpska. 912Nieminen constantly complained about the lack of cooperation of the US intelligencecommunity. They regularly took aerial photographs above the Republika Srpska, but when Nieminenasked for them, he was not given them. A White House adviser confirmed that this intelligence was notshared, and was kept for the Americans themselves. 913 Nieminen only received intelligence piecemeal,sometimes in the form of intercepts, but the question was whether it was always reliable. The Bosnianservices also intercepted communication traffic, which showed evidence of Serbian involvement. 914 Theintermediary concerned was Mirko Krajisnik, the brother of the chairman of the Bosnian-Serbparliament, Momcilo Krajisnik. The intercepts revealed that the Serbian Minister of the Interior andhead of the Domestic Security service, Jovica Stanisic, were involved in clandestine supplies of armsand fuel. 915The French and British intelligence services did give information to Nieminen ‘to balance USintelligence reports’, and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) contributed observers only in the autumn of1995, who had an anti-Serbian attitude, however. Nieminen also had to take disinformation intoaccount; the German embassy in Belgrade occasionally produced reports of suspect reliability. Forinstance, the embassy reported on 16 March 1995, probably on the authority of the BND, that atemporary bridge had been built over the Drina between Serbia and Srpska at Jagostica, which was usedto transport equipment to the VRS. Four border crossings were also mentioned across which goodswere smuggled to the VRS. The messages immediately raised doubts; the bridge would actually havebeen in the Zepa pocket and the smuggling of military goods destined for the VRS via a Muslim areawas unlikely. The British Army sent an SAS patrol to inspect the alleged bridge. The surroundingsturned out to resemble a Norwegian fjord, with a steep rock wall more than 200 metres high. TheGerman information was therefore incorrect, and the account of the smuggling via four border postsalso proved to be incorrect because all posts were monitored 24 hours a day by UN observers. 916 Theinformation of the Bosnian Muslims was likewise not always to be trusted. Sometimes Nieminen910 NMFA, PVNY. Biegman to Foreign Affairs, attached Bosnian memo, 04/09/95. Interview with Tauno Nieminen andAaro Suonio, 25/05/00. Confidential collection (6), Letter Nieminen to Owen and Stoltenberg, 31/05/95.911 Confidential information (149).912 Confidential information (150).913 Confidential interview (14).914 See Chapter 6 of this study for the Bosnian Sigint capabilities.915 Roy Gutman, ‘Arms-Running Traced To Yugoslav Regime’, Newsday, 29/05/96.916 Confidential information (9).