C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

109They made civil and military risk analyses. Risk analysis was carried out in a strictly military fashion:Derksen was a Major in the commandos with his own platoon, and acted accordingly.This team also established the basic structures for consultations with the NGOs, UnCivPol andUNMOs. They operated ‘with a blue cap on, using green methods’. Dutchbat II also boasted a goodliaison team. Contacts were initiated, developed and maintained. The objectives were as follows:escorting convoys, monitoring relief goods, fighting corruption, and maintaining contact with thepopulation. This team also functioned well and was given a pivotal role in the battalion. Collaborationwith the battalion commander was also good. 496The problems in this regard started with Dutchbat III. According to various MIS staff, the factthat Dutchbat III provided little tactical military intelligence was a problem. As they saw it, Karremanstook the position that he was in charge of a UN unit, not a national one. The intelligence officer wasconsidered to be one of us. There was no structural reporting; 497 in his period as Head of the UNMOs,General Gerard Bastiaans also turned against supplying intelligence. No intelligence was allowed to besupplied to the MIS/Army. Little or no response was made to specific or special questions from theMIS/Army. 498 It is strange in this regard that Karremans and Franken even refused to go into specificlogistics questions. In May 1995 the logistics section (in military terms: the G-4) of the RoyalNetherlands Army Crisis Staff was even forbidden to gather logistics data. 499Dutchbat III did have its own intelligence officer, Captain E. Wieffer, but he reportedexclusively to the Netherlands Army Crisis Staff, and not directly to the MIS/Army. This explains whyKarremans’ alarming letter (of 5 June) to the Army Crisis Staff did not become known to theMIS/Army until much later. 500 Wieffer sent daily Situation Reports to Sector North East (SNE) andMilitary Information Summaries to the Army Crisis Staff. He was only able to make extremely limiteduse of the experience of Dutchbat I and II during the additional training period in preparation for thedeployment of Dutchbat III. Wieffer concluded that the Army was no good at passing on experiences.As he saw it, the Army carried out debriefings, identified problems and discussed opportunities forimprovement, but often failed to carry things through. As a consequence, when evaluating adeployment, the same defects were observed as in the previous deployment, but no solutions weregenerated with a view to helping the following deployment. 501Dutchbat III therefore took its own initiatives. Dutchbat II soldiers on leave were invited toAssen for a day to inform their successors of the activities and working conditions. The initiative forthis was taken by the battalion staff and from one company. In this respect, there was a significantdifference with Dutchbat I, which had been unable to fall back on a predecessor. Dutchbat I wasordered to optimise the intelligence gathering process on the situation in and around the enclave. Withregard to the military aspect, all the objectives and intentions of the warring factions at all levels had tobe identified. In terms of the humanitarian situation, the borders of the areas containing ethnicminorities, refugees and the homeless had to be defined, with a view to supervising and protecting theoccupants. Dutchbat I was also ordered to seek out accurate information on local needs with respect tofood, heating, shelter and medical assistance. This had to be passed on to UNHCR and BHC. 502An important part of the transfer of knowledge was formed by analysis of the situation in andaround Srebrenica drawn up by Dutchbat I, and developed further by Dutchbat II. This document wasalso used in the training. 503 This meant that Dutchbat III did have good basic information at its496 MoD , Archive 101 MI S/ Cie , Van Jawad to Hakort, Debriefing report 101 MI S/Cie, 23/12/95.497 MoD, Archive SMG, 1004, report of a discussion with Col. Bokhoven, 20/07/95.498 Confidential interviews (28 ) and ( 37).499 MoD, SMG, DocID 18428, File 530, Box 1004 , Interview with E. Otterloo on the logistics aspects of Dutchbat, 31/07/95.500 See for this letter: Chapter 8 of this study. In June, the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff came to the following conclusion: "Karremans is reaching the end of histether". This conclusion was drawn on the basis of his correspondence. Confidential interview (23).501 Interview with E. Wieffer, 07/05/01.502 MoD , Archive MIS/Army 1994, Memorandum S2 BVT from Lmbl, May 1994.503 MoD, Archive MIS/Army 1994, File 1589, Zylab 13837 milinfo Srebrenica, October 1994.