C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

128There were several tins involved, and they had been sent from the Netherlands to the enclave. After thefall of Srebrenica, the deputy commander of Dutchbat brought and handed over that money to theRoyal Netherlands Marechaussee, which collected the German Marks. The money was subsequentlyreturned to the original source in Germany. This consignment was probably the tip of the iceberg. 605Furthermore, the Counterintelligence Bureau always requested that attention be paid toindications of services or favours being carried out in the Netherlands. In March 1995, there were anumber of known incidents where amounts of money were brought into Yugoslavia from theNetherlands. These involved soldiers of the Army who were approached by Bosnian Muslims while onleave in the Netherlands and who were asked to take parcels back with them. In these cases amountswere known to vary from approximately DM 500 to DM 25,000. The soldiers involved were usually nottold of the contents of the mail. The Dutch soldiers’ home addresses were apparently obtained in theconflict region. In this area the MIS/Army and the BVD did cooperate. 606 Sometimes, the Bureaureceived reports of this sort through the Military Security Section from the Dutchbat security officer.The Counterintelligence Bureau kept track of which services were attempting to recruit inBosnia. An attempt was even made by the CIA to recruit a Dutch UNPROFOR soldier. This matterwas discussed thoroughly by the Bureau with the CIA. The Bureau also observed that the ABiH andVRS recruited intelligence officers who had lived in the Netherlands. It collaborated closely oncounterintelligence with its foreign counterparts, who, surprisingly enough, often appeared to have hadequally little access to reliable intelligence. The US Army Intelligence and Security Command wasalways grateful to the Counterintelligence Bureau for supplying it with good intelligence on extremistfactions that were active in Yugoslavia.The US services had little data on this. In fact, the Americans appear to have been milking theirpartners dry. This meant that the US services had a hard time in the beginning; apparently they hadtrouble adjusting to the new international relationships in which there was no clear enemy anymore.The Counterintelligence Bureau’s collaboration with the Bundesnachrichtendienst was solid, as it was withthe British Security Services Organization (BSS), a British MI-5 security service unit in Germany.Generally, however, the MIS/CO did not have much use for British services. They attended mainly toBritish interests in Bosnia, such as Gorazde, and gathered no intelligence that might be useful to othercountries. In contrast, this was something that the Netherlands often did. 607The Counterintelligence Bureau reported regularly on the activities of paramilitary groups inYugoslavia. 608 It also examined the behaviour and the activities of Dutch mercenaries in the Balkans.They were mainly active in Croatia and involved in war crimes. For instance, the Dutch mercenaryJohan Tilder was followed intensively, partly as a result of a failed attempt to gather intelligence fromUNPROFOR. Tilder later died in Croatia. MIS personnel said he was ‘auf der flucht erschossen’ by localsoldiers. Incidentally, the Counterintelligence Bureau passed on the available intelligence onmercenaries to the Yugoslavia Tribunal. 609There was also a Military Security Section in the MIS/Air Force. Its head was at the same timethe Deputy Head of MIS/Air Force. Security in Vicenza was especially important;compartmentalization was thoroughly implemented there because of possible penetration. Account wasconstantly taken of aeroplane spotters. 610 An excellent opportunity for the MIS/Air Force to greatlyimprove its information position with respect to Eastern Bosnia presented itself when the DeputyHead of the MIS/Air Force was appointed deputy commander of Tuzla Air Base, which would play animportant role in clandestine arms supplies 611605 For this see also Chapter 6 in Part III of the Srebrenica r eport. to the ABiH in February 1995. In March 1995, the606 For reports on this, see: MoD, Archive MIS/CO, Memorandum BCI, No. DIS/95/12.14/777, 27/03/95; No. DIS/95/12.14/1208, 22/05/95 and No. BCI/950869, 19/05/95.607 Confidential interview (19).608 MoD, Archive MIS/CO, Memorandum of Head of Analysis and Production Section of BCI L. Zentgraaff, to the Secretary-General, No. BCI/0143/931402, 14/06/93.609 Confidential interview (19).610 Confidential interview (39).611 See Chapter 4 of this study.