C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

328build-up or of the aim to conquer Srebrenica. Bildt stated that the general assessment by ‘all analyticaland intelligence units in and out of the theatre of war at this point of time’ was that the VRS did notintend to take the entire enclave. 1824When verifying these views it is important to examine the flow of information withinUNPROFOR. Such prior information would initially have had to come from players operating withinthe enclave, such as Dutchbat, UNMOs, the British JCOs (SAS units), or non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs). In addition, the ABiH in the enclave and in the 2nd Corps in Tuzla could havebeen an important source of intelligence for UNPROFOR. Information from these sources wouldhave reached SNE, from where it would have been passed to Bosnia Hercegovina Command (BHC) inSarajevo and then to the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb. This would have been the route for themost important intelligence concerning Srebrenica, which could then have been supplemented by theinformation available to the various national intelligence and security services. The issue to be examinednext is to what extent this actually happened.Prior knowledge held by, and assessments made by, Dutchbat and the UNMOsAll documents and interviews indicate that Dutchbat was completely surprised by the attack:Karremans had no prior knowledge. The final situation report sent by Dutchbat on 5 July, just hoursbefore the start of the VRS attack, stated only that the situation was calm. 1825 Things were quiet in theenclave. At one OP 43 men and women set off in a southerly direction at the end of the afternoon. Theonly other report that indicated military activity was that the ABiH had occupied many positions closeto the line of confrontation and that another OP had reported seeing a trailer with a tank. 1826 InBratunac nothing had been noticed of the build-up for the attack on the enclave. The VRS liaisonofficer actually heard from Dutchbat, through the special telephone line, that the attack on the enclavehad begun. 1827 The commander of the SAS reported to his headquarters that he too had receivedreports mentioning VRS troop movements. He did not believe that Karremans regarded the VRS as aserious threat. In June Karremans had told a doctor of Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) that the ABiHwould be able to resist for at least seven days and was strong enough to prevent the fall of theenclave. 1828A first indication of the approaching storm was received on 5 July. Dutchbat reported that aconvoy had been seen consisting of five APCs, four T-55 tanks and five trucks, and the relocation of fiveartillery pieces from Bratunac to the south, as well as reporting that five tanks had been seen on the roadsouth of Zvornik. The report about the tanks originated from a UNHCR Field Officer, and the reportabout the artillery from the Dutchbat liaison team. 1829 These were not however indications that ledDutchbat or UNPROFOR to draw conclusions about an attack. The closest thing to a ‘storm warning’came from the G-2 (intelligence staff) of SNE. The reports from Dutchbat here led to the followingcomments:‘It is not known what the final destination is for the convoy or the arty [artillery]pieces but it may be a show of strength to keep the pressure on the enclave orto stop the movement of arms between the two enclaves of ZEPA andSREBRENICA. This may mean an increase in Warring Faction activity around1824 Bildt, Peace Journey, pp. 55 – 57.1825 MoD, Sitreps. HQ Dutchbat to Sector HQ North-East, Sitrep for period 041700 to 051700B Jul 95. The report of thetanks to the south of Zvornik came from a UNHCR Field Officer, and the report of the artillery at Bratunac from the LOTeam of Dutchbat. (Supplement to Daily Milinfosum 4 Jul 95. Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff).1826 MoD, SMG. Fax S2/3 Dutchbat to A-Comp. (Simin Han), 1 (Nederland/BE) Logtbat, Logbase Zagreb, Comcen CrisisStaff, Milinfo 040600 - 050600B Jul 95.1827 Interview with Jovan Ivic, 20/10/00.1828 Confidential information (1).1829 MoD, CRST. Supplement to Daily Milinfosum 04/07/95 and SMG 1004/59, Logbook G3 Sarajevo 4 July 18.00B.