C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

207conclusion that the contribution of GCHQ within the UKUSA alliance needed to be sufficient ‘and ofthe right kind to make a continuation of the Signals Intelligence-alliance worthwhile to our partners’. 1099Direct and hidden subsidies for the British Sigint efforts have certainly contributed to this. To give oneexample, British interception equipment was bought that was more expensive than comparableAmerican equipment.In 1992 MI6 and the GCHQ encountered problems as a result of the open British support forGeorge Bush’s presidential campaign. Clinton took exception to London’s behaviour and this wasinitially felt in the field of intelligence too, when the British services were to some extent ‘starved’ byWashington. Anglo-American intelligence relations improved after Prime Minister Tony Blair tookoffice in 1997, but nonetheless GCHQ became increasingly dependent on the NSA. As early as 1993,much of the Sigint processed by GCHQ was of US origin. In terms of finance, monitoring stations andsecure transatlantic communications links as well, the British were more or less dependent on the NSA.The British could for instance make partial use of an US Sigint satellite and GCHQ staff were secondedto the NSA facility at Menwith Hill to share in tasking and operating the satellites. Early in 1995, duringthe war in the former Yugoslavia, GCHQ exercised its capability to change the orbit of one of the USsatellite constellations to obtain better coverage of Bosnia, but ‘the NSA could override GCHQ, even1100in tasking the craft’.According to a senior US intelligence official this National Command override authority wasnever used, so far as he knew. According to this official it was a topic of a lot of policy discussion, andplayed far bigger than it ever really was. In this respect he remarked the following. ‘Why would the USrelinquish command authority over their own satellite when US vital National interests were at stakeand under what circumstances would a vital US National interest not also be of crucial concern to theUK?’ He knew of no circumstance when such an unusual conflict arose, much less require theimplementation of the National Command override authority. 1101It was in this relationship of dependency for the GCHQ that the war in Bosnia started. GCHQhad traditionally been interested in Yugoslavia, and this did not change when that country fell apart.The British services soon realized that when it came to intelligence in the former Yugoslavia they couldplace no reliance at all on the UN or UNPROFOR. The Head of the UK Defence Intelligence Staff,Air Marshal John Walker, put it as follows:‘Intelligence is a dirty word in the United Nations. The UN is not a thing initself; it’s an amalgam of 183 sovereign nations. If it does intelligence, it will bedoing it against a sovereign UN member, so it’s incompatible. But you need amilitary intelligence job to protect your troops. If you don’t, you pay for it inbody bags’. 1102As the United Kingdom’s political, military and humanitarian involvement in the events in Bosniaincreased, the British services soon started to set up a wide range of intelligence units in the region. Themost important task of these units remained the gathering of this intelligence for the Britishgovernment, not for UNPROFOR.The British resourcesOne British intelligence unit was stationed in Split, one at Bosnia Hercegovina Command (BHC) inKiseljak in central Bosnia, and later one in Sarajevo itself. This growing involvement in the war also led1099 Richard Norton Taylor, ‘GCHQ’s Service to US ‘Crucial’, The Guardian, 17/05/94.1100 Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, p. 300. The results were reportedly disappointing given the types of communications systemsused by the Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Also: Mark Urban, ‘The Magnum Force’, The Sunday Telegraph, 01/09/96.1101 Confidential information (80).1102 Urban, UK Eyes, pp. 238-241.