C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

170concluded nonetheless that there had been ‘no U.S. role in any clandestine military airlifts’. Nocomment was made on who was involved, or what actually happened. 855Journalists and researchers have asked the question whether it was not American aircraft afterall that carried out the Black Flights. The most common answer was that only one country actuallyqualified for these night-time operations: the United States. The fact is that it is unlikely that theAmericans would ‘blind’ their AWAC aircraft for Iranian planes. The operation was said to be havebeen paid for from a Pentagon Special Operations budget, with the complete assent of the WhiteHouse. Probably the most important members of Congress were informed in the deepest of secrecy,and they were therefore ‘in the loop’ concerning the events. 856In Tuzla itself it was impossible to establish via interviews with Bosnian military and intelligenceofficials the identity of the C-130s. It was clear from observations that not all aircraft physically landed,but that some dropped their load from a low altitude. From a technical point of view, later explanationsthat no American aircraft had ‘landed’ were then correct, but the question remains as to whetherabsolutely no American aircraft were involved.In Deliberate Force, Ripley describes how three Southern Air Transport C-130s from RheinMain airfield in Germany carried out the flights. It is not so strange that Southern Air Transport (SAT)crops up in this account: it was, like Civil Air Transport, Air Asia and Air America, former CIAproperty. These companies were involved in many secret CIA operations. They carried out hundreds ofBlack Flights around the world. It was only in the mid 1970s that these companies were sold, but theycontinue to perform so-called contract work for the CIA, and the service still exercises considerableinfluence on the affairs of the airline company. 857However, the involvement of SAT is still not self-evident. After all, if the CIA was not involvedin the secret operations in Bosnia, who then did use SAT? There is another reason why theinvolvement of Southern Air Transport was not self-evident: the company was far too notoriousbecause of its past. On the discovery of these Black Flights, fingers would quickly be pointing at theCIA. Other sources assert, according to Ripley, 858 that the Bosnian air force had a modest fleet ofplanes, consisting of a C-130 and CASA 212, Antonov AN-26 and AN-32 transport aircraft. Theseaircraft were allegedly stationed in Cyprus and Slovenia and were to have operated from Ljubljana andelsewhere. 859The question remains, however, whether this ‘relatively young Bosnian air force’ was capable ofperforming such operations. Ripley is of the opinion that the State Department and the NationalSecurity Council (NSC) were involved in the operation, and not the CIA or DIA. 860 This is probablycorrect: it seems that after the scandals of recent years the CIA has become more cautious with foreigncovert operations. They must be covered ‘by the book’ by the White House. 861 In addition, the directorof the CIA, Woolsey, was of the opinion that clandestine operations probably could not remain secretfor long. 862 Others concluded that private companies, such as Tepper Aviation, or IntermountainAviation were involved in the Black Flights. Both companies have a CIA background. 863 A British855 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence US Senate, U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian and Other Arms Transfers to theBosnian Army, 1994-1995, Washington DC, 1996, p. 4.856 Confidential interview (67) and interview with Tim Ripley, 12/12/99.857 See for the history of CAT: Leary, Perilous Missions, passim. For SAT and Air Asia: Prados, President’s Secret Wars, pp. 184,231 and 325.858 Interview with Tim Ripley, 12/12/99.859 Confidential information (35).860 Ripley, Deliberate Force, pp. 59-63.861 Confidential interview (12).862 Interview with R.J. Woolsey, 08/06/00 and Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence US Senate, U.S. ActionsRegarding Iranian and Other Arms Transfers to the Bosnian Army, 1994-1995, Washington DC, 1996, p. 4.863 Ranelagh, The Agency. p. 335. See also http://pw.1.netcom.com/~ncoic/cia_infor.htm, Results of the 1973 Church CommitteeHearings on CIA Misdeeds, p. 3 en Richard Kolb, ‘Into the Heart of Darkness. Cold War Africa: Part 2 Angola’, VFWMagazine, May 1999.