C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

55Soviet Union’s intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-distance bombers were, and still are, mosteasily detected from Canadian territory. 228This is further reinforced by the unique Canadian geography, the common Anglo-Saxonbackground, the similar systems of government, an almost identical military culture and the stronglyintegrated economies. This does not detract from the fact that the Canadian intelligence service wassometimes also cut off from important American intelligence, especially if Ottawa was pursuing adifferent policy from America. This happened on some occasions during the Vietnam War, theFalklands Crisis and the Gulf War (but not during the war in Bosnia). 229There is also a large amount of intelligence sharing in Western Europe between Europeanservices. This sometimes happens multilaterally within NATO or the Western European Union(WEU). It must be pointed out here that many services are reluctant to share their highest gradeintelligence within multinational organizations, because its dissemination then threatens to becomeexcessive. There is a preference for sharing intelligence bilaterally. When intelligence is shared, it usuallydoes not involve agents’ reports, intercepts, or satellite photos, but rather analyses derived from them.The joint approach in the EU on terrorism, the drugs trade and organized crime is also leadingto increased collaboration in the area of intelligence. The fact is that effective control demands theexchange of intelligence. The domestic security services, such as the British MI-5, the French Directionde la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), the German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and the DutchBVD, exchange intelligence within the so-called Club of Bern. Most European Union countries havebilateral agreements with each other 230 for intelligence liaison and bilateral agreements with the UnitedStates. However, these do not go as far as the American-British-Canadian collaboration.France is a difficult country with respect to intelligence liaison, because the many Frenchintelligence services seldom keep each other informed of what they are doing. While France has aComité Interministériel du Renseignement (CIR), which establishes priorities for the various services, there isno central system for the consolidation and analysis of all intelligence gathered. A centrally organizedmechanism would also be difficult to achieve, for both the president and the prime minister wouldwant to be at its head. The British and French intelligence services have often worked closely together,which is a tradition that goes back to the beginning of World War II. The French for example assistedin intercepting Libyan arms shipments to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). On the British side, it isadmitted that the quality of Humint that is shared with the US services is better than that shared withFrance, but ‘it is the quantity, rather than the quality of the UK-US "human intelligence" trade that is231unique’.Personal links between the SIS and the French foreign intelligence service, the Direction Generalede la Securité Exterieure (DGSE) and the French domestic security service (DST) are supposedlysometimes better than those with the CIA. However, some claim that the relation with the DGSE isnot good because the DGSE is ‘simply’ not good. 232 The collaboration between the GCHQ and theFrench Sigint organization is less warm. The main reason for this is that close links exist between theNSA and GCHQ, and the fact that the French Sigint priorities lie mainly in France itself and theFrench-speaking world. However, French Sigint efforts from Guyana were extremely useful to theGCHQ during the Falklands War.By contrast the allies of Germany remain fearful that the German services (and especially theforeign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst) are still infiltrated by Russian and EasternEuropean agents. There is therefore still a degree of hesitation on the part of some services regardingsharing intelligence with Germany. However, this fear is steadily decreasing. Furthermore, there aredifferent ideas about the quality of German intelligence, but it is generally considered to be mediocre.228 Richelson & Ball, The Ties That Bind, pp. 157-159 and 236-237.229 Confidential interviews (9) and (62).230 For this, see the various annual reports of the MIS and BVD.231 Grant, Intimate Relations, pp. 4-5.232 Confidential information (87).