C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

91The complete picture surrounding the assessment of the MIS regarding this collaboration ishazy. Various MIS workers have completely different assessments of the collaboration between theBVD and the MIS. Team Adriaan (BVD) and Team Olivier (MIS) allegedly had fierce conflicts witheach other on occasion, especially when it came to recruiting informants. 419 This recruitment took placeon the basis of the screening of refugees by the IND for the BVD, which subsequently debriefed them.Team Olivier then received all the intelligence that the BVD distilled from this process. The mostserious complaint of the MIS was that it was not itself allowed to interrogate Displaced Persons onspecific military aspects and perceptions, so that much intelligence was lost. MIS employees assertedthat the BVD put its own interests first. Refugees who might be of interest to the MIS because of theirlevel of military knowledge were only referred by the BVD in dribs and drabs. BVD officials claim theysaw little sign of this. According to them, all information of relevance to the MIS was sent to thatservice. 420 The working method improved later, and in particular refugees with a military backgroundwere passed on to Team Olivier. The collaboration was complicated because of the anti-BVD attitudein some sections within the MIS, especially in the Navy and the Army sections of the MIS (MIS/Navyand MIS/Army). The MIS sections of the Air Force (MIS/Air Force) and Central Organization(MIS/CO) were said to have been on better terms with the BVD. 421Another factor was that the BVD and the MIS did not always share the same views on theconflict in Bosnia. The BVD’s political-military analyses sometimes led to differences of opinionbetween these services. This was not particularly remarkable, since political or military analyses fromthe IDB, the BVD and the MIS on certain subjects had in the past frequently given rise to mutualdifferences of opinion. For instance, the distribution of the BVD’s interim report on the situation inthe former Yugoslavia of July 1992 led to criticism from the MIS. The superficial formulations in theBVD report were a particular target. For instance, the BVD analyst stated that the conflict in Croatiaregarding the Serb-occupied Croatian areas had definitely not abated. The MIS stated on the contrarythat in Croatia there were hardly any Serb-occupied areas, just as there were virtually no Croat-occupiedareas in Serbia. The Bosnian Serbs had been present for centuries in the areas of Croatia in which theywere dominant, according to the MIS, and the BVD formulation overlooked the fact that the CroatianSerbs had good reason to fear for their safety. In other words, the BVD presentation of matters, thatSerbia dominated these areas, was too simple. The comprehensive commentary concluded with theMIS’s wish to arrange coordination or cooperation meetings on a more or less regular basis, whichcould lead to the exchange of data and improve the information position of both service’s intelligenceproducts. 422This appeal apparently did not have the intended effect. At the CVIN meeting of 19 November1992, there was debate if there had been contact between the BVD and the MIS regarding the BVDreport that had been discussed at the meeting in question. The coordinator of the committee, theSecretary-General of the Ministry of General Affairs, Hoekstra, expressed the concern that ministerswould be confronted with reports that presented divergent views or that even contradicted each other.The BVD announced at this meeting through deputy head A. Kievits that the head of the MIS hadcorrectly observed that the report was dated: it described the situation of the previous summer. Kievitsalso observed that this was indicated in the text. According to him, there had been good contactbetween the BVD and MIS analysts who were concerned with Yugoslavia since that time. Kievitsemphasized that there could be no question of completely harmonized documents or coproductionsgiven the differences between the two services as regards powers and tasks. This did not detract from419 Confidential interview (20).420 Confidential interview (15) .421 Confidential interview (29).422 Archive BVD, No. 116679 , Letter O. Koerten, Director of State Security BVD, to Head MI S , No. 215435, 07/07/92 plus Interim report on Yugoslavia, 06/07 / 92 and Letter fromHMID Commodore P. Duin to the BVD, No. DIS/92/095/2852, 23/07/92.