C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

355transport VRS troops. 2006 However, it was forgotten to mention that this town was outside the territoryof the Drina Corps and that the observed buses therefore had little to do with the attack on Srebrenica.Just like the ABiH, the VRS transported all its soldiers by bus. The CIA director John Deutch, in aletter sent to The New York Review of Books, denied that his service had had prior knowledge. This was aremarkable step, because in the past the CIA had seldom responded to a wide range of accusations.There were also no intercepts of conversations between Perisic and Mladic. An internal StateDepartment document also denied that there had been any prior knowledge. 2007 In addition the authorspoke to two U.S. intelligence officials who independently from each other checked US Sigint archivesand not a trace could be found of the intercepts. 2008 Apart from this, these important interceptscertainly would have ended up in the daily reporting of the purely US Joint Analysis Center (JAC) inMolesworth. The author was able, thanks to a foreign intelligence agency, to study these reports over aperiod of many months before, during and after. However, these intercepts as mentioned by journalistsnever showed up in the daily reporting of JAC, Molesoworth, which sometimes had the highestclassifciation grade. It was again an indication that one can have doubts about the existence of theseintercepts.In a response the authors of the article in The New York Review of Books stood by their story. Ananonymous source confirmed the existence of these raw intercepts. There was a ‘week’s worth of suchintercepts about the coming assault on Srebrenica’.2009 As the VRS had imposed radio silence andcommunicated over secure landlines, this claim may be doubted. Newsday also wrote about the existenceof prior knowledge. General Nicolai saw reports concerning the Arkan Tigers. ‘They always showed upat places where something was about to happen’, according to Nicolai. ‘That also was an indication thatSrebrenica was on their wish list’. 2010 But a report of the wandering Arkan Tigers, weeks before theattack, is absolutely not the same as a hard indication of an attack on Srebrenica.What was the response in the Netherlands to all these revelations? The information was sodisturbing that Voorhoeve contacted his US colleague and asked him for clarification. Perry assuredVoorhoeve during their meeting in Williamsburg that the Pentagon knew of nothing. An investigationby the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) showed that a ‘review of the intelligence prior to 10 July2011does not reveal any tangible evidence of an intent to completely take control of the enclave’. Thequestion of whether the CIA or the NSA knew something was not asked, and so was not answeredeither. In order to be quite sure, General Van den Breemen also inquired with the chairman of the USJoint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General John Shalikashvili, who assured him that no crucial intelligence hadbeen kept back. 2012 The military adviser to Boutros-Ghali, General Van Kappen, had also talked tovarious sources in the Pentagon about the issue of prior knowledge, where he had been assured ‘handon heart’ that the information in question had not been held. He had no reason whatsoever to doubtthis. 2013 So what is true of all these claims in the press and other publications that the CIA or otheragencies was aware of the preparations for an attack? Since Mladic first decided on 2 July to ‘shave’ theenclave at the southern edge and on 9 July to take over the entire enclave, any prior knowledge of theattack would have been minimal and the aforementioned press reports cannot be true. Ambassador2006 Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, ‘Bosnia: What the CIA Didn’t Tell Us’, The New York Review of Books, 09/05/96. ForLane’s background in the debate on Bosnia: cf. UNNY, UNPROFOR, Archive SRSG, Box 87717. Jim Shear to Akashi,15/10/94 and Charles Lane, ‘Brock Crook’, The New Republic, 05/09/94.2007 American FOIA, State Department memorandum, 19/12/96.2008 Confidential interviews (13) and (54).2009 ‘The CIA and Bosnia: An Exchange’, New York Review of Books, 06/06/96.2010 Roy Gutman, ‘UN’s Deadly Deal’, Newsday, 29/05/96.2011 Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, ‘Bosnia: What the CIA Didn’t Tell Us’, The New York Review of Books, 09/05/96.2012 MoD, MIS/CO. Memorandum: to CDS; Re: Intelligence on attack on Srebrenica; Drafter: Lt. Col. Van Geldere;Annotation: Col. J. Mulder Head MIS/Army; 18/03/97.2013 B. Ummelen, ‘Verenigde Staten ontkennen wetenschap aanval op Srebrenica’ (United States denies knowledge of attackon Srebrenica), De Limburger, 14/10/95.