C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

221Monitoring targets in SerbiaOfficials of the international intelligence community, who are mostly quoted anonymously inpublications, believe that the NSA certainly gathered Comint from Serbian and Bosnian Serbgovernment communications links. Intensive monitoring of the microwave telephone network of theYugoslav government, by means of satellites, special aircraft and other interception methods, reportedlyenabled the NSA to intercept telephone calls between Milosevic in Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbleader Karadzic in Pale. According to officials of the US intelligence community, these intercepts clearlyshowed that Milosevic gave considerable political and military support to the military operations of theBosnian Serbs. 1174 Milosevic is reported to have been informed of the attack on Srebrenica (see alsoChapter 8). 1175 Intercepts reportedly showed that Milosevic was equally aware of, and also agreed to, theprogramme of ethnic cleansing as conducted by the Bosnian Serb government. This material is said tobe so incriminating that long before his arraignment by the Yugoslavia Tribunal, in July 2001, theauthorities had been considering the prosecution of Milosevic. The US government decided however tokeep the peace process alive, and thus to continue to make use of the services of Milosevic, because hewas seen as the most important political personality in the Balkans. 1176 The trial of Milosevic will needto show whether these claims are correct.The existence of these intercepts was confirmed by a western diplomat. During a meeting at theWhite House between Gore and Bildt, the Swedish negotiator tried to convince the US vice-presidentthat he should not form an excessively black-and-white image of President Milosevic. Gore respondedto these statements by reading from US intercepts, which showed that Milosevic had consulted withMladic about the attack on Srebrenica. Gore then reportedly said to Bildt: ‘Forget about this. Milosevic1177is absolutely not the friend of the West.’ However, it should be noted that Bildt has no recollectionthat this happened. 1178US intelligence officials claimed, however, that in fact there are no intercepts, which mightindicate a possible involvement by Milosevic in the war crimes around Srebrenica. ‘After all, he’s not anidiot’, commented one CIA officer. According to this official, the microwave traffic was indeedmonitored, but this resulted mostly in tactical military intelligence, gathered by the ‘vacuum cleaner’method. The down side of this method has already been mentioned: due to the enormous quantity ofintercepts much important material was missed by the Serbo-Croat translators. A Vortex satellite, forinstance, intercepted 22,000 telephone calls a day. As a result, the Americans gained most of theirstrategic intelligence not from satellites, but mostly from taps on hardware. 1179A former French intelligence official confirms that Milosevic had no prior knowledge of theattack on Srebrenica. Asked whether the French Military Intelligence Service (DRM) had intercepts ofconversations that Mladic and Karadzic conducted with Belgrade (Milosevic or the Chief of Staff of theVJ, Perisic), or whether this service had any indications about what Mladic was planning, the formerHead of this service, General Heinrich, answered negatively. The reason he gave for this was thatMladic and Karadzic did not trust other people. Heinrich claimed that Mladic mostly communicatedwith Belgrade via an underground fibre-optic cable. He said that the Americans had employed manysecret methods, but ultimately failed to intercept this communications traffic regularly. When they did1174 ‘Washington gaf tribunaal bewijs over oorlogsmisdaden Milosevic’ (Washington provided tribunal with proof of warcrimes by Milosevic), De Volkskrant, 29/05/99.1175 According to the Bosnian Serb politician Rajko Dukic, Milosevic reacted with great surprise to the attack. Interview withRajko Dukic, 14/06/00.1176 Karsten Prager, ‘Message from Serbia’, Time, 17/07/95 and Tim Sebastian, ‘The Secret Deal: Why Justice Won’t BeDone’, The Sunday Times, 25/02/96. See also: Ian Bruce, ‘Allies hamper inquiry’, The Glasgow Herald, 01/12/95.1177 Confidential interview (53).1178 Confidential interview (101).1179 Confidential interviews (12) and (13).