C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

1841996 they donated another $ 500,000 to his election campaign. Only at the end of 1996 did the USgovernment get its own way, and Bosnia severed the military and intelligence links with Iran. 9646. Special Forces in BosniaThe signing of the Washington Agreement in March 1994 and the institution of a ceasefire in centralBosnia made an effective liaison between UNPROFOR and the warring factions necessary to supplyaccurate information to the UN commanders. The activities, expertise and competence of the UNMOswas deemed insufficient. Furthermore, the UNMOs did not fall under the authority of Bosnia-Hercegovina Commander Rose. London therefore decided to introduce special troops into Bosnia,which were known as Joint Commission Observers (JCOs). 965 In reality these were units of the SpecialAir Services (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS).The JCOs operated in small teams of a few soldiers. Attempts were made to create amultinational JCO organization, but because of the different levels of skill, poorly coordinatedcommunication facilities and the lack of a joint intelligence infrastructure, the mixed patrols were nogreat success. There were various SAS operations in Bosnia. The Guardian reported a special SASoperation involving ambulances, which carried communication equipment instead of stretchers. These‘ambulances’ were donated to Bosnia by the British Humberside health authority out of humanitarian966considerations, but would often suddenly appear in the most surprising places, such as in the Bihac.According to a former UNPROFOR worker, the JCOs were already active in Bosnia from 1992 andgathered UK-eyes-only Humint. These JCOs reported within a UK-eyes-only chain. Part of what theygathered was shared with the UNPROFOR Military Information Office in Zagreb. 967An SAS unit was stationed in Gorazde 968 and an SAS unit was also sent as JCOs toSrebrenica. 969 The primary underlying objective of the JCOs in Srebrenica was to gather intelligence onDutchbat and to discover whether anything illegal was happening between the ABiH and Dutchbat. 970On 18 March 1995, a new two-man JCO team arrived in Srebrenica. They relieved a team of fourJCOs, consisting of three British soldiers and a Swedish soldier nicknamed ‘schwarzenegger.’ 971 On 17May, a third British solder joined this new team. The patrol was attached to the commandos inPotocari. The JCOs were mainly involved in the normal reconnaissance patrols. This SAS unit was easyto identify by their British uniforms. 972 Shortly after his arrival in the enclave, their commander had ameeting with Karremans, whom he immediately offered support, such as the use of secure satellitecommunication equipment. The SAS unit also worked with one time pads (codes for one-off use) andcryptography equipment. According to a British intelligence service official, the SAS communicationtraffic was unbreakable. 973Karremans insisted that the JCOs should work only with the commandos. The JCOsencouraged the commandos to explore ‘hot spots’, and to talk with the warring factions, which untilthen they had not done. However, Dutchbat soldiers were not allowed by the battalion leaders to have964 Barry Schweid, ‘CIA: Bosnia has broken military, intelligence ties with Iran’, Associated Press, 31/12/96; James Risen, ‘Irangave Bosnia leader $ 500.000’, Los Angeles Times, 31/12/96 and James Risen, ‘Report of Bosnian Spy Network stirs concernsin U.S.’, Los Angeles Times, 06/02/97.965 Confidential information (1).966 Ed Vulliamy, ‘Britain’s secret war in Bosnia’, The Guardian, 02/04/96 and Franchet, Casque bleu, pp. 27-30.967 Confidential information (39).968 MacDonald, SAS, p. 153-154.969 See for a personal account of one of the SAS soldiers: Nick Cameron, ‘Witness to Betrayal’, The Sunday Times, 07/07/02;Left to Die’, The Sunday Times, 21/07/02 and ‘Going in for the Kill’, The Sunday Times, 21/07/02. ‘Britse Defensie wil SAS’erSrebrenica de mond snoeren’ (British MoD wants to silence SAS soldier), Leidsch Dagblad, 01/08/02.970 Confidential interview (68).971 Interview with D.J.E. Veen, 11/01/99.972 Interview with C.J. Matthijssen, 11/10/99.973 Confidential information (1) and interview with J.R. Mulder, 06/10/98.