C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

178received intercepts, but account was always taken of the possibility of disinformation. In that period, asmentioned, many Bosnian reports were sent to the UN of large quantities of tanks and trucks thatcrossed the Drina.The American observers in his team were often frustrated by the response from Washington,which only complained there that their reports were incorrect. Contradictory reports came fromWashington, but they also often appeared to contain incorrect information. Although one ofNieminen’s closest colleagues was a State Department official, the Americans remained reluctant toshare their intelligence openly. 917 Therefore the mission was constantly confronted with disinformationabout sundry tanks that crossed the Drina. A member of the mission gave as an example the attack onZepa, in which American and German services claimed that tanks had been moved across the Drina. Itturned out later that the two services used different aerial photographs, where the German photo wasnot of the Drina but of a completely different river.The relationship with the US services improved later. The mission then received intelligencefrom the CIA on trucks that were moving to and fro between Serbia and Srpska. This service was ableto say precisely which trucks were involved, the nature of the cargo, and the time and the place thatthey would cross. However, it was only in the autumn of 1995 that the mission received this918intelligence rapidly and in good time; by which time American ground forces had arrived.A ‘very hot potato’ were the helicopter flights from Serbia to Srpska. The following mysteriousepisode may serve as an illustration. On 7 February 1995, Nieminen was phoned by UN negotiatorStoltenberg. Fifteen to twenty helicopter flights were said to have passed the border, and to havelanded somewhere near Srebrenica. These helicopters came from Serbia.919 The US intelligencecommunity had probably informed Stoltenberg of this. 920 Nieminen then drafted a special report forthe Security Council. On 8 February came the Serbian denial that there had been any flights; on 22February, Nieminen had a talk with Milosevic on the helicopter flights, which he also denied. On 2March, UNPROFOR reported again that between 21 and 27 February nineteen helicopters had flownfrom Serbia to Bosnia. Nieminen demanded immediate clarification, but the VJ claimed that it knewnothing. 921 A new report was made on 27 March: this time it involved 27 helicopters, which flew at anextremely high altitude from Serbia to VRS territory. On the way back, the helicopters probablydeliberately flew very low, so as to avoid the radar systems; Nieminen was told that the AWACS hadproblems tracking helicopters.Nieminen had earlier ordered a large-scale investigation. On 28 March 1995, Lieutenant ColonelR. Gudmundsson presented his findings to Nieminen. Between October 1994 and March 1995,observers from the Belgrade airfield, Surcin, had recorded a total of 73 cross border helicopter flights.Radar tracks from various radar posts confirm this. All posts were linked with the two most importantair traffic control centres: one in Zagreb and one in Belgrade. Four radars were available in Surcin, butthey did not have a wide range. They were too far from the border between Bosnia and Serbia to beable to track low flying aircraft.The radar tracks came exclusively from a radar post that was situated approximately 90kilometres from the border with Bosnia. The 79 violations were distributed as follows: there were 6violations of the No Fly Zone in Bosnia. This also included ABiH flights. 922 There were 13 violationsinvolving flights from Serbia to Bosnia. The remaining 60 violations were helicopter flights fromBosnia to Serbia. In March 1995, in other words shortly after the Black Flights to Tuzla, a total of 30917 Also regarding the financing of the mission. At the beginning of March 1995, the United States had still made nofinancial contribution. Nieminen also complained about this: UNNY, UNPROFOR, Box #88041, file 4.4 Notes onMeetings, Bell to Akashi, 16/03/95; confidential information (152).918 Confidential interview (42).919 Interview with Tauno Nieminen and Aaro Suonio, 25/05/00.920 Confidential interview (42).921 Interview with Tauno Nieminen and Aaro Suonio, 25/05/00.922 For example near Srebrenica: UNNY, DPKO. Janvier to Annan, Z-483, 26/03/95.