C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

193Chapter 5The Signals Intelligence war of the Westernintelligence services in and around Bosnia1. Introduction‘In God we trust, all others we monitor’(motto of an intercept operator)Intercepted conversations played an important role during the war in Bosnia and interceptedcommunications traffic had become an area of interest just a few months after the fall of Srebrenica.‘Intercepts’ and prior knowledge of the attack on Srebrenica have been inextricably linked in variouspublications. The article by the journalist Andreas Zumach published in October 1995, also printed invarious newspapers in the Netherlands, can serve as an example here. 1026 According to Zumach varioussources claimed that from 17 June 1995 onwards, more than three weeks before the attack started,American intelligence services had monitored the daily conversations between General MomciloPerisic, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, the Vojska Jugoslavija (VJ), and General Ratko Mladic.Zumach is not specific which US intelligence service was supposedly reading this traffic and ismore or less lumping all 17 US intelligence services into one group. Nevertheless, in theseconversations the two generals are said to have planned the operation against Srebrenica. Excerptsfrom these conversations were reportedly published. The conversations proved that the initiative forthe attack on Srebrenica came from Belgrade. Perisic is said to have had command of the actual attackon the enclave. This intelligence about the planned attack was not passed on to UNPROFOR in ordernot to disrupt the peace efforts of President Clinton.1027 When asked about this, Defence MinisterVoorhoeve said he was aware of these reports; he addressed an inquiry about their correctness to hisAmerican colleague William Perry. 1028Until the present day, knowledge about the role and importance of Sigint in the years after theend of the Second World War can actually best be described as ‘an inventory of ignorance’. The Britishhistorian Christopher Andrew wrote:‘The biggest gap in our knowledge of United States intelligence collectionduring the Cold War concerns the role of Sigint. No history of the SecondWorld War nowadays fails to mention the role of the Anglo-American codebreakers in hastening victory over Germany and Japan. By contrast, mosthistories of the Cold War make no reference to Sigint at all’. 10291026 Andreas Zumach, ‘US Intelligence knew Serbs were planning an assault on Srebrenica’, Basic Reports, No. 47, 16/10/95.See also: ‘VS wisten van komende val Srebrenica’ (US knew of impending fall of Srebrenica), Nederlands Dagblad, 13/10/95and ‘VS wisten al weken tevoren van val Srebrenica’ (US knew about fall of Srebrenica weeks in advance), De Gelderlander,13/10/95.1027 See also: ‘Amerikanen verzwegen voorkennis Srebrenica’ (Americans kept advance knowledge of Srebrenica forthemselves), De Stem, 13/10/95.1028 Ewoud Nysingh, ‘Joegoslavische generaal leidde aanval op Srebrenica’ (Yugoslavian general led attack on Srebrenica), DeVolkskrant, 31/10/95.1029 Christopher Andrew, ‘Conclusion: An Agenda for Future Research’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 12 (1997) 1, p.228.