C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

189The third party country strategy offered an even better way out of this dilemma: the so-called‘Croatian pipeline’ (arms supplies from Iran to Croatia and from there to Bosnia) was an alternative tostrengthening the Muslims and Croats in a military sense after the creation of the Muslim-CroatFederation. Furthermore, a stronger Bosnia and Croatia would ensure a reduction of the pressure onWashington to send ground forces.The American government could do nothing towards supplies by third party countries, becauseCongress had removed that possibility. A law drafted by senators Nunn and Mitchell banned the use ofgovernment funds for the support of or assistance in enforcing the arms embargo. It is the firmconviction of Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, who in 1993-1994 was chairman of the British JointIntelligence Committee, that American personnel themselves were not involved in the purchase andtransport, but were responsible for the funding. According to her, these supplies definitely were aflagrant violation of international law: the actions of these bodies meant that the American governmentviolated Security Council resolutions. 1004As such, the UN itself in part also generated these secret operations. The fact is that Bosnia wasofficially admitted to the United Nations as the 177th member state. It is strange then that the SecurityCouncil did not draw the logical conclusion that a new state may take measures for defence against anarmed attack. The embargo curbed the legal arms trade, but did nothing to reduce the demand for, andthe supply of, arms, and only displaced it onto illegal circuits. 1005Although the US government will have observed the increasing influence of Iran, they put upwith it. Sarajevo would ultimately, it was thought, allow the political and military solidarity with theUnited States to take precedence over that with Teheran. In the course of time, US intelligence serviceswill have established that the number of Mujahedin fighters was not considerable and moreover thatthey were not in great favour among the Bosnian population. The military leaders of the ABiH also hada low estimate of their fighting power. The Mujahedin seen especially as a ‘political tool’ for obtainingthe support of some countries in the Arab world.At the same time, the Islamic fighters played a role as a political lever: Izetbegovic was awarethat Saudi Arabia and Turkey were unhappy with the Iranian influence. 1006 There is no doubt that theBosnian government will have played this trump card to gain the support of these two countries.Izetbegovic clung as long as possible to the Iranian connection, but in 1996 Sarajevo had to let go ofthis under US pressure. The same was also true of bringing in the Mujahedin. They were tolerated inBosnia, and were used by Izetbegovic as a political lever for attracting funds in the Middle East.In view of the long history of Turkey in the Balkans, an active role in the region for this countrywas predictable. The traditional Greek links with Serbia and the political support of Athens to Belgradewill without doubt have played a role. Furthermore, Ankara will have wished to contain the Iranianinfluence. Turkey was a perfect candidate to serve as a direct supplier. The armed forces had theaircraft, arms and logistic infrastructure. Operations could take place undisturbed from the Turkishoccupied part of Cyprus, and Croatia and Bosnia were easy to reach. The American ‘logistics patronage’moreover ensured that the flights to Tuzla remained ‘unseen’. It was likely that the Croatian pipelinewould be discovered, but because UNPROFOR did not have the mandate and the resources to actagainst it, it did not matter. It was likewise to be expected that the direct flights to Tuzla, Visoko andBihac would be seen, in spite of the fact that the AWACS had been rendered ‘blind’ or did not fly. TheAmericans managed through damage control to limit the damage, while taking a further step-up in the1007pressure on transatlantic relations into the bargain.The indirect American support of the ABiH by looking the other way in the presence of directarms supplies and the Croatian pipeline were described as a sort of ‘Vietnamization’ of the war. Inother words: a strong ABiH was created, which was able to compensate for the lack of American1004 Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.1005 Johan Peleman, ‘Wapenhandel naar Bosnië-Herzegovina’, Noord-Zuid Cahier, Vol. 3 (1997) 22, pp. 94-95.1006 See also: Roger Cohen, Hearts grown brutal, p. 408.1007 See also: ‘Allies and Lies’, BBC Correspondent, 22/06/01.