C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

237as the Balkans. Two to three years were needed to get the operation running really well. However, itwas not until 15 August 1995 that Eibergen made its first tactical military reports on Yugoslavia. 1256The military and political Comint relating to Bosnia that was nonetheless intercepted whileDutchbat was in that country was primarily intended for the intelligence agencies of the three branchesof the Armed Forces (see Chapter 3). According to a MIS member, all relevant information obtainedfrom Comint was passed on (in paraphrased form) via the Netherlands Army Crisis Staff toDutchbat. 1257 This claim can be doubted, however, because hardly any Comint was available at the MIS.Research by the NIOD in the Military Inteligence Service archives in The Hague, the formerTechnical Information Processing Centre (TIVC) in Amsterdam and the former 898th Signals Battalionin Eibergen indicates that, prior to the fall of Srebrenica, there were just a few intercepts or integraltranscriptions of intercepted signals traffic from Bosnia, and these bore no relation to the attack by the1258VRS on the enclave.The archives did however contain standard reports on unidentified military networks in Bosnia.These did not however contain any hard information, but dealt more with procedural traffic. This couldin itself be useful to the MIS for localizing and charting certain troop forces. This material was obtainedvia interception by both the Dutch and foreign sister organizations. None of the data present makesreference to fighting in or around Srebrenica. This could be ascribed to the geographical location of theenclave (in a valley), which made it technically almost impossible to intercept local radio traffic aroundSrebrenica from Eibergen. 1259 Research in the archives of the First Tactical Air Force Signals Groupand the 898th Signals Battalion also shows that, between 9 and 20 July, no information was available onthe Drina Corps of the VRS, which carried out the attack on the enclave. 1260On 15 August 1995 Eibergen started producing and supplying reports. This resulted in reportson the target area, but still in modest quantities. Moreover, the capabilities did not extend beyondmilitary traffic on the HF frequency. Intercepting military VHF traffic in the region was not feasible, asthis could not be ‘netted’ in Eibergen. The shorter the range of the transmitter, the harder it is tointercept this. VHF communications from tanks have a range of about 60 km, for instance, and canonly be monitored from aircraft or some satellites. Indeed, no Western partner is reported to have hadmonitoring equipment on the ground in the Srebrenica area in this period which could have interceptedsuch short-range traffic. The mountains and the topography also made it harder to intercept themilitary traffic.So even from August 1995 onwards the Sigint situation was not good; one should also note thatdifferences between day and night, between summer and winter, and technical factors could also allaffect the interception of communications traffic. It was not possible to precisely determine thetransmission point of signals. The TIVC, operating with HF interception from Eemnes and satelliteinterception from Zoutkamp, was not aimed at the Balkans in 1995 either. In the period from 1993 to1995 the interception capabilities of the TIVC were confined to HF radio traffic and telexcommunications via satellite. It was not possible to intercept telephone and fax traffic via satellite.Furthermore, between 1993 and 1995 the TIVC exchanged raw interception material with sisterorganizations; this material comprised intercepted HF and satellite communications traffic (telexmaterial). Fax material was not exchanged during this time. 1261To sum up, some intelligence was exchanged with partners, but since the MIS did not havemuch to offer it also did not receive a great deal of intercepted Sigint. In addition, the MIS did notfocus on the Inmarsat satellite, and it was precisely through this channel that most communications1256 Confidential interviews (21) and (33).1257 MoD, SMG, Report of interview with Col. Bokhoven, 25/07/95.1258 MoD, MIS, Overview report Bureau A-4 to HMID/RNLA, no. 31701/4/130395, 13/03/95.1259 Confidential interviews (21), (22), and (33). See also: MoD, MIS, Internal information by mr. D. Bijl to the WOB requestfrom the NOS Journaal, Strictly Confidential, undated (ca. 24/03/99).1260 MoD, MIS, Signal days 95190 to 95199.1261 NIOD, Letter from MIS, Department AVI/BR&C to C. Wiebes, 10/07/00.