C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

366latter fact could have been an important source of intelligence for NATO if the VRS had activated theradars. 2064However, were the Dutch military not again too prudent? TACRECCE played an importantrole throughout the summer, and into the air campaign in September. There may have been tacticalrestrictions placed on NATO aircraft due to the proximity of Srebrenica to the Serbian border and theSAM defenses on the other side. Nevertheless, there were tactical aircraft operating in the vicinity ofthe enclave (as shown in the previous chapter) before, during and after the fall. But such restrictionswould certainly not prohibited them. Nothing would have prevented the Dutch from flying their ownTACRECCE assets over their own troops and in support of the interests of the UN. According to aUS intelligence official ‘no NATO commander would stand in the way of such action, especially not aman like Admiral Snuffy Smith’.The F-16 would probably have been ideal for such reconnaissance missions. Probably evenbeter than an UAV, which often encountered frequent morning mist and low cloud cover. An UAVloiters at medium altitude and uses its substantial focal length to observe objects on the ground. Typicalloiter altitudes were 5000 feet above ground leve, well above any small arms fire. But TACRECCE ismost capable against medium foul weather, and a properly equipped aircraft like the F-16 can use cloudcover to its significant advantage, especially in a heat-seeker SAM threat. According to a senior USofficial, the SAM can’t see through the clouds, and the aircraft can drop below the cloud cover, toaltitudes of 500 meters or even less, just long enough to collect the imagery and then retreat to safetyback above the clouds, or in the clouds. ‘That sort of flying takes guts, and willingness to take some bigchances’. For TACRECCE aircraft, there’s no intent to remain hidden while taking the pictures, unlikethe UAV. One TACRECCE pilot once said: ‘I know I never bombed any of the enemy, but by God,there’s a bunch of them that can’t hear too good’. 2065A number of precautionary measures were taken following rumours that the Arkan Tigers hadbeen sighted. After consultation between BHC and Karremans it was decided to prepare a swiftevacuation of the OPs. The report of Arkan Tigers in the area is cited by many publications at theultimate proof that something was going to happen. However, this was information that dated from theend of May. 2066 It was assumed that, in view of the number of VRS troops, their strength and the lackof heavy weapons on the ABiH side, there would be hardly any warning. An attack could take place atany minute and this situation had actually existed since 1993. In short, most of the players in the regionhad no clear indications. This also went for the JCOs (SAS), NGOs, SNE and BHC. 2067 At the end ofJune there were a few indications that something was going to happen, but nobody knew exactly what.The UNPROFOR intelligence officers in Sarajevo and Zagreb had no forewarning and continued tobelieve that the operations were aimed at the southern tip of the enclave. On 12 July it dawned inZagreb that the VRS had taken over the enclave. 2068The Force Commander’s meeting on 12 July announced that the UN forces had accomplishedtheir task within the means available. In the aftermath of Srebrenica, the Force Commander’s primaryconcern was the food, health of refugees; secondary concern was assisting DutchBatt in theirretrograde (from the fallen enclave). The Force Commander’s meeting concluded that support fromNATO had been good and DutchBatt had reacted in a remarkable way. 2069The MIS/CO and MIS/Army were equally unaware of what was coming. Right up to the endanalysts were unsure as to the real intentions of the VRS. The MISs assumed, just like UNPROFORand other intelligence services, that the attack would be aimed at the southern part of the enclave. This2064 Interview with Jan-Inge Svensson and Ingmar Ljunggren, 04/11/99.2065 Confidential information (80).2066 Confidential interview (3).2067 Annan stated the same. See: United Nations, Srebrenica Report, 1999, p.143.2068 Interview with Jan-Inge Svensson and Ingmar Ljunggren, 04/11/99.2069 Confidential information (80).