C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

176did not extend to Croatia. What was supplied from this region via the Krajina to the VRS therefore felloutside his field of view. 902There were rumours about pipelines across the Drina that provided the Bosnian Serbs with oil,but Nieminen stated that he knew for certain that they had never existed. His mission had foot andvehicle patrols in operation 24 hours a day along the banks of the Drina: they would at least have seentheir tracks or trucks. The same applied to all the claims about pontoon bridges. In an official report,the Bosnian government actually claimed that 25 secret military pontoon bridges were being used. Halfof them were between Bijeljina and Zvornik. 903 In one of the weekly overviews, Nieminen did reporton such a Serbian pontoon bridge. According to the Yugoslav Army liaison officer, it was built in thissector to deal with refugees in case of a possible ABiH offensive. 904 Sometimes oil would be takenacross in small boats or with a number of barrels at once. Trucks also drove to and fro with full dieseltanks between Serbia and Srpska.The question then remains as to how the Yugoslav Army, the Vojska Jugoslavija (VJ), supportedthe VRS. According to an European intelligence service, the VJ was active in East-Bosnia. This servicegathered intelligence that proved that many parents in Serbia were complaining that their sons had togo to Bosnia. The obituaries in Serbian newspapers were scrutinized, only to reveal that soldiers hadperished in Bosnia. Conscripts were sent over the border in groups by bus. They consisted mostly ofapproximately fifty soldiers without equipment, who had probably exercised in Serbia. Furthermore,Serbian staff officers worked in Pale, VRS officers were trained in Serbia and the VRS were paid theirsalaries via Belgrade. Much logistics support was also given to the VRS. Repairs and spare parts wereprovided by the VJ, and the VRS equipment was kept up-to-date by Serbia. The transportation of tanks905and APCs was coordinated by the VJ.According to Nieminen, it must not be forgotten that before the arrival of the observers,Milosevic had had all the time he needed to supply as much as possible. 906 His opposite number inSerbia, Kertis, was the greatest smuggler, according to sources within Western intelligence services. 907He was instructed by Milosevic to keep Nieminen’s mission happy. Whatever Kertis said happened, theobjective of which was ‘to keep us happy so that nobody would blame Milosevic’, according toNieminen. 908 Violating the embargo actually meant that the sanctions against Serbia would beintensified again.The mission of Nieminen would run into trouble in late May 1995. There were air strikes onPale on 25 May 1995 and hostages were taken in reprisal. On 29 May, the American embassy reportedthat information had been obtained about a direct threat to the American observers. This resulted in allUS and ten Canadian observers immediately being withdrawn. The majority of the observers camefrom MPRI and the others were from the State Department. According to an intelligence officer, aftermuch urging Nieminen, who in the first instance disagreed with the withdrawal, was finally shownreliable intelligence that proved that they actually were in danger. The CIA was said to have shown theFinnish General reports that made clear that the US service had a source or sources close to Mladic orKaradzic. They also showed him intercepted message traffic. In Pale the decision had already beenmade to take American observers hostage and to abduct them over the Serbian border to Srpska; after909that the Finnish General agreed with the withdrawal of the observers.The original plan was that the mission would comprise 250 observers. This was never achieved,however, and the maximum staffing was 210, from September to October 1994. Nieminen’s mission902 See for the military border traffic: UNNY, DPKO. Janvier to Annan, Z-1120, 09/07/95.903 NMFA, PVNY. Biegman to Foreign Affairs, attached Bosnian memo, 04/09/95904 Confidential information (148).905 Confidential interviews (48).906 Interview with Tauno Nieminen and Aaro Suonio, 25/05/00.907 Confidential interviews (48).908 Interview with Tauno Nieminen and Aaro Suonio, 25/05/00.909 Confidential interview (42).