C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

150‘In fact, one of the great miscalculations of Serb military strength in the formerYugoslavia was made by Russian military intelligence (GRU). Out of a wish tostrike a blow at NATO hegemony and out of revenge for having lost the ColdWar, the GRU constantly overestimated the Serb’s ability after summer 1994, towithstand Croatian and/or Bosnian offensives’.According to Corwin, the US administration also had a tendency ‘to overestimate the military strengthof the Bosnian Serbs, at least publicly, albeit for different reasons’. 722In spite of the fact that the CIA had been bypassed in these operations, Woolsey offered tohave the CIA set up the secret operation for smuggling arms to Bosnia, only if a finding was signed byPresident Clinton. But this was rejected: Lake still feared that it would leak out. 723 Otherwise Lakeappeared to have a pathological fear of leaks; he shared little information with others and was difficultto approach. He was nicknamed ‘the submarine’. 724 Woolsey confirmed that he was not aware of apresidential finding, and that in May 1994 he went to the NSC, and later to the Secretary of State toobtain information on the supplies, but to no avail. Talbott told him that his station chief in Zagrebmust do nothing and make no comment. According to the Assistant Secretary of State, it concerned a‘policy decision of the US Government’; the president could after all ask an ambassador to dosomething.Woolsey was surprised at this state of affairs; after all, the CIA had built up the necessaryexperience with covert operations. If policymakers were to have requested him to organize the secretarms supplies, then his service would have taken care of the execution, even if he was opposed to it:ultimately this was one of his duties. Woolsey:‘We would rather have had control and could have done it better and withoutIranian involvement (...) The CIA did not move weapons to Bosnia. We wereperfectly willing to do that. We had enough experience in this field but thepolicy level did not want the CIA to do that’. 725The Senate concluded later in 1996 that Talbott should have explained the policy - not to block thetransit of Iranian arms for Bosnia via Zagreb - more clearly to Woolsey. Meanwhile the Iranian armssupplies had indeed leaked out: on 24 June 1994, the Washington Times printed the story of the ‘wink’towards Tudjman. The precise details remained rather vague for now. 726There were also suspicions regarding the Croatian pipeline within UNPROFOR. On 18 July1994, Akashi reported that the Bosnian Muslims were receiving large quantities of new arms viaCroatia, which was demanding financial compensation or a share of the goods. Akashi was unable totake any action against this because UNPROFOR was not even allowed to inspect the Iranian aircraftat Pleso Airport in Zagreb. 727Iran may well have been permitted to supply arms to Bosnia, but not to receive any arms itself.The fact that the CIA was not involved in the Croatian pipeline did not yet mean that Iran had a freehand: for instance, in August 1994 a shipment of advanced technology from Slovenia, destined for Iran,was intercepted in Vienna following a tip off from the CIA. 728722 Corwin, Dubious Mandate, p. 127.723 J. Risen & D. McManus, ‘U.S. had options to let Bosnia get arms’, Los Angeles Times, 14/07/96 and W. Pincus, ‘Woolsey,in testimony, Criticizes White House’, The Washington Post, 11/06/96.724 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 243.725 Interview with R.J. Woolsey, 08/06/00.726 See: http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1996, Congressional Record, ‘Arms Shipments to Bosnia from Islamic Countries(Senate - April 17, 1996), Speech by Senator Joseph Lieberman.727 O’shea, Crisis at Bihac, p. 156 and UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124. Akashi to Annan, Z-1106, 22/07/94.728 Marko Milivojevic, ‘slovenia - An Arms Bazaar’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 6 (1994) 11.