C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

357In this respect the author Russell points to the following distinction. Secrets are facts that canbe stolen by Humint collectors. Mysteries, on the other hand, are projections of the future that are lessvulnerable to human collection and tend to be the bailiwick of analysis. 2018 However, as Russellcorrectly observed, these criticisms, moreover, neglect the fact that CIA is not designed to be a ‘combatsupport agency’. CIA’s charter has been to provide strategic-level intelligence primarily to civilian policymakers and not tactical intelligence to battlefield commanders. While military commanders are oftenprone to fault CIA for perceived shortcomings, they appear reticent to fault their own military serviceintelligence shops and the DIA whose charters are to provide tactical combat support to fieldcommanders. Accordingly, DIA and military intelligence manpower for conducting tactical militaryanalysis dwarfs that of CIA. 2019Nevertheless, an initial signal regarding Srebrenica was sent by Karadzic in his speech on 23May, in which he said that he wanted to get rid of the enclaves, but at that time the CIA was unawarethat this announcement fitted in with the VRS strategy. According to US analysts the operations in July1995 were to some extent coordinated with Belgrade. There was no pressing military need for the VJ toassist the VRS in an attack; the VRS had sufficient manpower. But did the VRS only want the southernsection, or did it want the entire enclave? This question long remained unclear. The CIA did not expectMladic to go for the entire enclave. The service had little intelligence regarding Serb intentions and theactual course of events, and was confronted with an army that operated with small units and a fewtanks in the woods. 2020 This made it hard to keep track of the VRS and no hard indications wereobtained. What was the situation for other US intelligence services?The Bureau of Intelligence & Research (I&R) at the State Department had no prior knowledgeeither. This bureau was in a unique position: it liased with all US intelligence and security services. Agreat deal of tactical military intelligence was held on the warring factions. The Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA) did some fine work and kept track of the order of battle. There were few surprises in themodus operandi of the VRS because this did not deviate from that of the VJ. The standard approach was:firstly artillery and mortar bombardments, then the deployment of tanks and infantry, and thenparamilitary units and special police. This was the systematic pattern that almost always presented itself.This service managed to chart all VRS positions involved in the siege of Sarajevo. The DIA also hadexcellent intelligence on Northern Bosnia, but there was very little intelligence on Eastern Bosnia. Oneproblem was that the DIA gathered a great deal of humanitarian intelligence, but this was neveranalysed within the DIA and was thus often lost. The DIA concentrated only on military operationsand many humanitarian issues were not passed on to I&R. Besides this, although the DIA was good on‘capabilities’ it was weak on ‘intentions’.Much tactical military intelligence was not shared with other services, but retained by the DIAfor itself. Four months after Srebrenica, for instance, much DIA material was discovered inWashington that had never been sent to Zagreb. Much of its intelligence was chiefly examined for itsmilitary value, and in this case attention was mostly devoted to variations in the military battle order.The best sources were formed by the press, NGOs and Displaced Persons. In any case the StateDepartment’s I&R did not expect an attack. 2021 Many interviews confirm that most intelligence andsecurity services were not aware of the coming attack. This is not so surprising in view of the short timeneeded by the VRS to set up the operation. Moreover, the radio silence observed by the VRS meantthat little was intercepted.2018 Richard L. Russell, ‘CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117 (Summer 2002), 2, pp. 196-197and 206.2019 Richard L. Russell, ‘CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117 (Summer 2002), 2, p. 204.2020 Confidential interview (7).2021 Confidential interviews (12), (13) and (76).