C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

259made it impossible to follow these messages. 1365 This was confirmed by a message sent by the 2 nd Corpsto the 28 th Division on 9 July 1995. The 2 nd Corps had intercepted a encrypted message between theVRS General Staff in Han Pijesak and the Drina Corps, which the ABiH was unable to decode. The 2 ndCorps suspected that it related to the shelling of Srebrenica. 1366 At a lower level, VRS units usedcodebooks. For instance, the word ‘tank’ was assigned number 323 and ‘lorry’ 325. The ABiHsometimes managed to get their hands on VRS codebooks during military operations, but the VRSchanged the system every day. All the words were assigned new numbers. It was only when the fightingstarted that plain language was used again.A study conducted by some foreign Sigint experts in Konjuh, Okresanica and Tuzla in 2000revealed that the interception equipment used during the conflict was suitable for intercepting theaforementioned messages. In Okresanica a twelve-metre high antenna was found with different typesof aerials attached. There was also a parabola antenna with a diameter of 1.5 metres which was intendedfor monitoring UHF radio traffic (above 300 MHz) and a YAGI antenna to intercept the VHFfrequency (30-300 MHz). These were placed on a two-metre-high mast on top of the reception tower,giving an effective height of 842 metres above sea level. This tower stood at the top of MajevicaMountain.One of the radio systems that were used was the RRU 800. This was a 12- or 24-channel radioreceiver that worked on the 610-960 MHz frequency and had a maximum range of 70 kilometres. Anextra RRU 800 was available for communication traffic at greater distances. This system targetedcommunication between brigades and their headquarters. The second radio system was the RRU 1.This receiver intercepted messages at 230-270 MHz and had a range of approximately 50 kilometres.The RRU 1 targeted the communication traffic between the headquarters of battalions and brigadesand could also be used as a mobile Comint system. One of the key ABiH targets was Veliki Zep. Boththe RRU 800 and the RRU 1 systems in Okresanica focused on this. Veliki Zep, Cer and Gucevo werethe most important communication nodes of the VRS. Communications in Veliki Zep were interceptedwith an ICOM IC-R100 VHF/UHF receiver. Seven UHER tape recorders were used during theconflict. An ABiH officer in Okresanica said that he had read an intercept, which indicatedinvolvement by the local police in the VRS operations after the fall of Srebrenica.Konjuh was an interception station, which was not far away from Olovo and Kladanj. It wassituated at the top of a mountain at some 1,316 metres above sea level. Originally, Konjuh had been animportant relay station for communication in former Yugoslavia. When the ABiH threatened to seizeKonjuh, the VRS tried to destroy the station, but were prevented from doing so by a swift ABiHoperation. Konjuh was then converted into an ABiH intercept site. This is where the VRScommunications on the column from Srebrenica to Tuzla were followed. It was closed after the DaytonAccord. 1367 There were still tape recorders in the building in 2000. The former staff in Konjuh said thatthey had only UHER tape recorders at their disposal during the conflict. Communications wereintercepted with a parabola antenna with a diameter of 1.5 metres and two other antennae. These werestill directed at Veliki Zep. 1368What warning did the ABiH claim to have about the attack on Srebrenica?In 1995 the Comint capabilities in Srebrenica itself were still very limited. The 28 th Division of theABiH did not have enough specialists or equipment. They used the Paket and Pactor to listen in toVRS communications. According to a former ABiH general, the VRS observed a radio silence from themoment it opened Pribicevac as its command centre and headquarters (from which the attack on1365 Confidential interview (73).1366 NIOD, Coll. CD-Roms. ABiH Komanda 2. Korpusa to Komanda 28. Divizije br. 02-/8-1132, 09/07/95.1367 Konjuh is now being used as an intercept site by the US Army’s 103 rd Military Intelligence Battalion from Fort Stewart,Georgia. E-mail from Matthew M. Aid to Cees Wiebes, 19/12/00.1368 Confidential information (39).