C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

369believes any news in Sarajevo.’ 2081 This observation was also made in a CIA report, which stated thatthere were some indications, such as the bringing up of reinforcements. But:‘similar troop movements had been recorded around the enclave dozens oftimes in the past, and the VRS was constantly adjusting its forces all acrossBosnia. There was no special indicator, which would particularly distinguishthese reports among hundreds of reports over the months and across the2082country’.This mechanism may have been reinforced by the many false alarms, which the Bosnian Muslimsfrequently issued in their attempts to get UNPROFOR and NATO on their side. This applied toEastern Bosnia too. In May the JCOs reported that ‘there were constant rumours at this time from theABiH that the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) were planning to attack the Enclave’. This did not lead to allalarm bells going off: the SAS was not impressed. They had often heard such rumours and they ‘werethus hard to take seriously’. The same was true of 8 June, when a major alarm was sounded. But at thetime that the VRS was busy with its preparations the ABiH did not issue any serious warnings.Did ‘noise barriers’ play a role? At various times since the start of 1994 Mladic had declared thathe wanted better control over the southern tip of the enclave, but he did not say how and when hewanted to achieve this. His intentions remained unclear right up to the last. The international contextalso worked as a noise barrier, because the attention of the major policymakers such as Janvier, Akashiand Smith was directed towards matters of a more strategic nature, and not Srebrenica. Eastern Bosniahad low priority and the same attitude was true of most of the Western intelligence and securityservices. According to an ex-member of Akashi’s staff, it was an enormous intelligence failure. IfAkashi had known what was going to happen then he would have reacted differently: above all becauseof his political ambitions. He thus brought himself into an impossible position with regard to theleading members of the Security Council. Srebrenica proved the decisive reason for ushering him fromthe stage through a side door. According to this source it was a sort of standard thinking at the UN(and hence an intelligence failure) that the Bosnian Serbs simply would not know what to do with thetens of thousands of refugees. The greatest failure was that it was not imagined in advance that the VRSwould murder all the men and less the question of whether they would take over half the enclave or allof it. In itself this is strange because military logic demands that one should assume the worst, i.e. theVRS wanted to take the entire enclave. The failure therefore also lay with the Dutchbat personnel,according to this source, because they were the only ones who, possibly with the help of the JCOs,could have gathered intelligence about an attack. 2083 However, this former member of Akashi’s staffforgot to mention that nobody could foresee the massmurders. There was no automatic link betweenthe attack and atrocities.Self-generated noise also played a role. Policymakers were not able to adjust their expectationsabout the Serb intentions and capabilities in accordance with reality. Thinking was dominated by the2084‘sheer nerve scenario’ (i.e. the VRS would never have the nerve to attack the enclave). A VRS assaultwith the aim of conquering the entire enclave did not fit the general pattern of expectations. In otherwords, policymakers clung to belief systems, and these created a filter in the perception of reality andthe making of corresponding judgements. Reality was not determined by the actual situation, but by theimage that those involved had of it. For as long as possible they attempted to perceive theirenvironment in the most cohesive manner possible and to avoid certain contradictions. Many wereinclined to avoid cognitive dissonance (i.e. the tension arising between new information and established2081 Corwin, Dubious Mandate, p. 131.2082 See: CIA Report, Chapter Srebrenica: Background and Battle, p. 15, CIA, ‘Balkan Battleground: A Military History ofthe Yugoslav Conflict, 1991-1995’, unpublished, 13/07/99.2083 Confidential interview (46).2084 Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.