C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

340BHC also had no indications of VRS goals beyond the southern tip of the enclave. 1906 The USambassador in Zagreb, Peter Galbraith, also stated that he had not seen any intelligence about theattack. 1907 The operations officer in Zagreb, the Danish officer Colonel K. Bache, could only surmise ata possible attack. He expected that the VRS would respond to the ABiH’s nightly hit and runoperations. The VRS could no longer summon the patience and wanted to put an end to this. He alsomade the following observation. Zagreb was totally dependent for its decision-making on the reportssupplied by Sarajevo. And this was precisely the problem: in General Smith’s perspective Zagreb was along way away. Little information arrived from Sarajevo. According to Bache Zagreb was completely‘out of touch with the events in SNE’ due in part to the relationship between Janvier and Smith: ‘theydid not like each other’. The attack on Srebrenica ultimately came as a great surprise to Zagreb.Bache’s diary and that of Tony Banbury clearly show that the possibility of an attack onSrebrenica did not once appear on the agenda of the daily briefings.1908 Colonel Harm de Jonge, whoattended all crisis meetings in Zagreb, also confirmed that the attack came unexpectedly. 1909 The reportsof the Senior Staff Meetings chaired by Akashi and the Force Commander give the same picture. Astudy of the reports from 30 June to 12 July indicates that Srebrenica received almost no attention inZagreb and that the VRS build-up was completely overlooked. 1910All official documents, diaries and interviews indicate that the VRS intentions remained unclearright up to the last moment and up to the very highest level of UNPROFOR. The records of the dailycouncil between Akashi and Janvier in Zagreb shows that even when the enclave had already fallen intothe hands of the VRS, there was still uncertainty about the intentions of the Bosnian Serbs. On 12 Julyan Interoffice memorandum from the Zagreb intelligence section provided an estimate of the VRSintentions. This update was based on the events of the previous day. Two options were noted; a limitedVRS operation to take a firmer hold on the enclave, to minimize the ABiH activities, to free troops, totake hold of the black market in the enclave and to further increase the pressure; or conquest of theenclave. The reasons for the second option were the same as the first, plus to test how farUNPROFOR was prepared to respond seriously and to send a strong signal to the ABiH. The VRSshowed in this way that it was still able to carry out such operations. The bombardments in the northof the enclave ‘point to VRS intentions to collapse the Enclave further’. Possibly the events aroundSarajevo had led to a decision to free troops more quickly, and this ‘now outweighs the politicalbargaining value of the enclaves’. If Mladic wanted Srebrenica, then it was expected that Zepa wouldsoon follow. The VRS might leave Gorazde alone. 1911 An ‘after action analysis’ by the G-2 Staff inZagreb also shows that no tactical prior knowledge was present. This document kept to the view that,in the short term, the VRS would continue to concentrate on the strategy of strangulation and the useof the ‘humanitarian weapon’ instead of launching major operations. The conquest had created a totallynew situation. 1912 To summarize: there are no indications that senior military and political officials ofUNPROFOR in Zagreb had any knowledge of the troop build-up around the enclave. Officials inTuzla, Sarajevo and Zagreb were totally in the dark as to the intentions of the VRS. 1913 But did the samego for New York too?1906 Confidential interview (45).1907 Interview with Peter Galbraith, 23/06/99.1908 Interview with K. Bache, 29/10/99.1909 Harry Meijer, ‘Voor VN kwam aanval onverwachts’ (Attack came as surprise to UN), NRC Handelsblad, 27/07/95 andinterview with J.H. de Jonge, 27/09/99.1910 UNNY, ICFY, Archive FC, Senior Staff Meetings, 30/06/95-14/07/95.1911 Confidential collection (4). G-2 UNPF HQ, Update: Assessment on Srebrenica enclave – VRS intentions, G-2 Rick Morgan(drafter Capt. Theunens) to COS, 12/07/95 and G-2 UNPF HQ, ‘BIH Hostile Attitude towards Unprofor”, G-2 RickMorgen (drafter R. Theunens) to COS, 12/07/95.1912 Confidential collection (4). G-2 UNPF HQ, Srebrenica: the Aftermath, G-2 Rick Morgan (drafter Capt. Theunens) to COS,13/07/95.1913 See also: Westerman & Rijs, Het Zwartste Scenario, p. 148.