C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

161and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8 rocket. The total forwarded in transit to Srebrenica was 50,000 7.62mm calibre cartridges, 35 mines (82 mm), 75 mines (60 mm), 90 B.R. M-93 machine guns, 123uniforms and 124 pairs of shoes. A computer and a printer were also delivered to Srebrenica. 794Evidence of flights to Tuzla Air BaseNothing was done with Moldestad’s report on 10 February 1995 that he had heard a Hercules C-130 onTuzla Air Base. The Norwegian logistics battalion (known as NorLogBat), 4 kilometres from TuzlaWest, also reported observing three unidentified aircraft: one cargo aircraft and two jet fighters. Thecargo aircraft was described as a four-engine Hercules; the two fighters each flew close to either of thewing tips of the C-130 and left the area immediately after the Hercules has started the final approach.This was a familiar flying trick, because it created the impression on the radar screen that only oneaircraft was in the air. Independently of this, Norwegian medical personnel (of NorMedCoy) reportedseeing the same C-130. Shortly afterwards, observers heard how the jet fighters skimmed over Tuzla.At 18.45 hours a report arrived that all the aircraft had left again. These events were repeated on 12February. 795 After these observations, the Norwegian commander drafted an official report(Vakrapport), which summarized all the reports of NorLogBat and NorMedCoy, including theobservations of 10 and 12 February. The NorMedCoy observer was extremely emphatic: he had seenthe Hercules. 796Not only did the Norwegians draft a report, but the headquarters of Sector North East alsoimmediately sent a report to Bosnia-Hercegovina Command in Sarajevo. The author was LieutenantColonel C.A. Le Hardy. It started with: ‘this is a sensitive report.’ The report set out the events:immediately after the first reports, a patrol was sent to investigate. It arrived on the spot one and a halfhours later. This patrol was fired on near the Tuzla Highway Strip, and then surrounded by thirty ABiHsoldiers. The patrol saw five trucks near a few old hangars, 797 but were forced to leave without beingable to observe an aircraft or inspect any possible military cargo. There was nothing strange about thefact that the patrol did not see a Hercules: the aircraft left again within barely one hour at 18.45 hours,while the patrol only arrived at 19.30 hours. The ABiH had sufficient time to hide, camouflage, orremove in trucks the delivered arms and military goods.In fact, the Hercules would not actually have had to land: according to Le Hardy, it was possiblethat a ‘para-extraction delivery method’ was used, which is a way of performing ‘low-altitude extractionof cargo airdrops’. In this method, ‘kickers’ at the ends of the cargo holds push the load out of theaircraft at extremely low altitude. Le Hardy was otherwise unable to confirm this. Tuzla Main was798certainly not used in this operation. Le Hardy considered the risks attached to the operation to berelatively high, and therefore the value of the load was probably considerable. There was a suspicionthat what was delivered was not so much heavy arms but rather communication equipment. 799 Heavyarms may well have been urgently needed, but this risk, in view of the limited quantity that a Herculeswas able to transport, would not have been justified. Furthermore Le Hardy pointed out thatMoldestad’s and the Norwegian sentry’s statements were made in quick succession, so that there couldbe no question that they were both mistaken.The Norwegian sentry, Lieutenant Saeterdal, was an observer with a great deal of experience,800which he had gained with UNIFIL in Lebanon. The staff temporarily attached to the Fifth Allied794 NIOD, Coll. Ivanisovic. Avdo Palic, Zepa to Asima Dzambasocicha, Sarajevo, Broj:08--20-454/95, 19/04/95.795 Confidential collection (12), ‘Reports of Possible Fixed Wing Flight Activity at Tuzla 10/12 Feb 95’, 18/02/95.796 Confidential collection (12), Letter from the AftenPosten editorial team to BBC Panorama, 03/10/95 plus NorwegianVaktrapporten.797 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 139. G-2 HQ UNPROFOR, Daily Info Summary, 11/02/95.798 Interview with Hans Holm, 08/03/99.799 Confidential interview (43).800 O’shea, Crisis at Bihac, p. 158.