C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

130command. The incident involving the tins of rice did not result in a criminal prosecution; Couzydecided no action was necessary. 615The Military Security Bureau and DutchbatThe Bureau thought it important to have its own representative in the enclave. Someone was assignedto this task in the deployment of Dutchbat I. However, Commander Vermeulen did not want him togo to Srebrenica, so that Military Security ended up having no contact of its own. They had no directlines of communication of their own either, and everything was arranged through soldiers on leave whobrought with them reports from the deputy S-2. Someone from the Bureau was attached to DutchbatII, but his commander sent him to Simin Han, after which the Military Security Bureau again had noone in the enclave. Accordingly, there was little reporting on internal problems in DutchBat I andDutchBat II, while in contrast, there were many reports concerning internal problems in DutchBat III.In mid 1994, a first signal was sent to senior officers of the Army that ‘this situation could notgo on’; it was not possible to keep the Commander-in-Chief properly informed in this way. The DeputyCDS for Operations then issued a written instruction to the commander telling him to cooperate, andto give the Military Security Bureau all the space they needed from that point on. The Bureau’srepresentative was only to be allowed to carry out only military security tasks and no other activities.This only worked well in the case of the individual charged with this task in Dutchbat III, E.A. Rave.An additional advantage was that Rave and the Military Security Bureau officer responsible were oldfriends. They had worked together previously in an observation team. This officer went to Karremansand explained to him what Rave had to do. Rave occupied himself mainly with counterintelligence andsecurity, and not so much with gathering intelligence. 616Rave’s predecessor in Dutchbat II had given him the tip of working in the liaison team, becausethis would give him the most freedom of movement. Rave was also advised: ‘make sure that you getinto the enclave’. This was certainly necessary since the lack of a Military Security representative hadmeant that the rules with regard to security in the enclave were extremely disorganized. NonethelessRave was given a role in Dutchbat III. Another important reason for Rave’s arrival was that Karremanswas the first commander to understand the importance of such an officer. His predecessors found itunnecessary. The problem was that Rave had no special secure link, which prevented him fromperforming his duties optimally. The Army or MIS/Army apparently did not deem it as essential, whichwas remarkable (to say the least). Rave therefore often had to make all sorts of cryptic remarks on thetelephone. 617 This gave the Military Security Bureau an incomplete picture of the situation in Srebrenica.In spite of this, Rave was regularly able to issue intelligence.Preparation for the deploymentDuring a meeting in Assen, the Military Security Bureau gave a briefing prior to the departure ofDutchBat III. In the period of Dutchbats I, II and III, this bureau was responsible for the militarysecurity aspects during the deployments. The briefings generally lasted two hours. After the briefing,there was another one from the Intelligence Department. It was observed that Karremans and hisdeputy Franken adopted a ‘tough’ attitude; they expected that the VRS would not even considerconfining Dutchbat III to the enclave. ‘If necessary Dutchbat III would fight its way out’, according toFranken. The latter was often to be reminded of this tough talk later. 618During the briefing, attention was paid to issues such as taking good care of personal property,not leaving personal documents lying around, not admitting interpreters to the Operations room, not615 Confidential interview (35).616 Interviews with E.A. Rave, 13/12/00 and 14/12/00.617 Interviews with E.A. Rave, 13/12/00 and 14/12/00.618 Confidential interview (20).