C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

350leave. No mention was made of the chance of a coming attack. 1972 A study of the weekly reports by theMIS/CO about the developments in Bosnia also provided no indication that an attack waspredicted. 1973The report from the end of June stated that the political leadership in Pale had hinted atpossible negotiations, but with conditions unacceptable to Sarajevo. Mladic, however, had declared thatthe chances for peace in the short term were negligible. Following the ABiH sorties from Srebrenica,Pale had once again cast doubt on the neutrality of UNPROFOR. There was no indication that thecited Serb accusations of ABiH infiltrations and sorties were accurate. According to the MIS/CO it wasconceivable that with such reports the VRS was hoping to create a justification for new operations inEastern Bosnia. 1974 In fact, just three days after the attack on Visnjica the MIS/CO was wrong in thisrespect.The first report by the Intelligence Department in July mentioned Karadzic’s announcementthat the VRS would shortly start offensive operations to force the Muslims to accept a politicalsolution. According to Karadzic a rapid and coordinated attack on the ABiH would enable the VRS togain maximum advantage from its dominance in heavy weapons. This was preferable to a continuationof the current situation in which the initiative lay with the ABiH, forcing the Bosnian Serbs to dealsimultaneously with a large number of relatively small-scale operations. The MIS/CO judged this1975statement as notable because Mladic had just predicted a longer war.On 5 July the MIS/CO prepared a briefing for the Defence Crisis Management Centre. Onereason for a ‘major’ attack could be that the VRS needed a success that could not be achieved in otherparts of Bosnia. The advantage was that these enclaves could be occupied with relatively little effort.After clearing away the enclaves, the VRS would be free to act in Eastern Bosnia, the line ofconfrontation would be reduced and troops would be freed for other tasks. Srebrenica would probablynot be attacked because the enclave could be reduced piece by piece, partly through collapse fromwithin. The taking of OP-E provided an example of this. Although the VRS could take the enclave in arelatively short time, it would probably result in a large number of casualties. A disadvantage of such anattack was thought to be that the VRS would be seen as the main guilty party and UNPROFOR couldbe prompted to use NATO air power. 1976 The MIS/Army drew an identical conclusion.The fact that both the MIS/CO and the MIS/Army remained in the dark as to the intentions ofthe VRS after 9 July is also indicated by the weekly report by the Intelligence Department of theMIS/CO issued on 11 July. In this document it is concluded that for the time being there was noreason to assume that the latest VRS operations were the start of attempts to take total control ofSrebrenica. The VRS units involved (a hundred men and four tanks) were insufficient for the task. Itwas assumed that the VRS would maintain pressure on the enclave and would continue with gradualand modest territorial gains. It was true that the VRS had advanced close to the edge of the town, but1977the main road was now blocked by Dutchbat. This conclusion was not remarkable, because all theanalyses available up to then (BHC in Sarajevo, Zagreb, Deny Flight Intelligence Summary in Naples,the UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and JAC, Molesworth) pointed in precisely the same direction.And since the MIS analysts mostly gained their information from these sources, their conclusions andprognoses were in line with the other available analyses. It was only in the analysis made after the fall1972 MoD, MIS/CO, Memorandum: ‘Developments in the former Yugoslav Federation’, No. 27/95, 08/07/95.1973 MoD, MIS/CO, Intelligence Dept., ‘Developments in the former Yugoslav Federation’, No. 28/95, concluded14/06/95, No. 29, concluded 21/06/95 and No. 30/06, concluded 27/06/95.1974 MoD, MIS/CO, Intelligence Dept., ‘Developments in the former Yugoslav Federation’, No. 31/95, concluded29/06/95.1975 MoD, MIS/CO. ‘Developments in the former Yugoslav Federation’, No. 32/95, concluded 04/07/95.1976 MoD, MIS/CO. Memorandum on briefing dd. 05/07/95.1977 MoD, MIS/CO. Intelligence Dept., ‘Developments in the former Yugoslav Federation’, No. 33/95, concluded11/07/95.