C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

106by UNPROFOR in Zagreb, and there was a slight discrepancy between Dutchbat’s maps andUNPROFOR’s maps. This discrepancy led, for example, to Force Commander De Lapresle’shelicopter only being able to land in the Srebrenica compound at its third attempt on his visit toSrebrenica on 2 February 1995. 481 Maps with coordinates became available later, but in general it can bestated that there was initially no overabundance of geographical intelligence. 482Once the dispatch of soldiers to Bosnia had got under way, it would be logical to expected thatmembers of Dutchbat would be used as sources of intelligence. The information position of theMIS/Army could have been improved considerably by using the ears and eyes on the ground, but thisdid not happen. For instance, the European Bureau was not allowed to pass on questions to theintelligence officers of Dutchbat and its ‘predecessors’, the Signals Battalion and later the TransportBattalion. Although this was proposed by MIS/Army, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armyrefused permission. The Deputy Head of the MIS/Army was later rapped on the knuckles again forthis by senior Army officers, whereupon the heads of the MIS/Army forbade MIS/Army analysts tore-establish direct contact with Dutchbat, 483 because intelligence activities were not permissible in a UNcontext. Via a detour, the questions were subsequently presented through the MIS/Army SecuritySection, so that some information did then dribble in.Where Sigint at the MIS/Army was concerned (Bureau A-4), the MIS/Army had instructed the898 th Army Signals Battalion in Eibergen to take a ‘look’ at Yugoslavia in 1994 or thereabouts. Theoperational order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army indicated that day-todayoperational command in this regard lay with the MIS/Army. From 1993 to 1995, Bureau A-4 onlyhad the unit in Eibergen at its disposal as far as Sigint was concerned, and it had no say over theTechnical Information Processing Centre (TIVC) in Amsterdam, which was the province of theMIS/Navy. The TIVC’s only customers were the Navy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the BVD.The MIS/Army and MIS/Air Force therefore had no direct access to the communications traffic thatwas mainly intercepted in Zoutkamp and Eemnes. At this time the first language course in Serbo-Croatwas initiated at the MIS School by the Signals Intelligence Bureau of the MIS/Army. The problem wasthat the Eibergen antenna was oriented on the East-West axis, which made it difficult to interceptmessage traffic in the Balkans. The MIS/Army also had insufficient translation capacity and there weretechnical problems too. During the war in Bosnia, use was mainly made of walkie-talkies such as theMotorola. A separate analysis capacity is necessary for intercepting Motorola message traffic. This wasnot feasible in the Netherlands; it was only possible on the spot.In 2001 some (former) employees of the MIS stated that, in 1995, their service was still mentallyand technically oriented towards the East. There were two other reasons why the MIS had so muchdifficulty ‘averting its gaze’ from the East with regard to Sigint. In the first place, there was aninvestment freeze and departing from the East-West axis would have been an expensive business. Asecond reason had to do with the undertaking that had been made within NATO to this effect. If theMIS/Army were not to fulfil its existing obligation, then it would have nothing whatsoever to sharewith its partners.Meanwhile, there were still no resources and military direction being given, not even from theleadership of the Ministry of Defence. Between 1993 and 1995, the Ministry simply took no interest inSigint, the procurement of which was considered too expensive. The use of Sigint during the Dutchbatdeployment was therefore tightly restricted by a dearth of resources, personnel and equipment. TheBureau A-4 (Signals Intelligence) was, as has already been stated, severely handicapped by the fact thatno Sigint on Bosnia was being obtained from the Americans. According to some MIS workers, theAmericans were also extremely frugal when it came to sharing such intelligence with the UnitedKingdom and Germany as well. 484 MIS/Army staff stated that it was only after the fall of Srebrenica481 MoD, Archive, Box 1004, TA9A to TX8, 21/02/95.482 Confidential interview (34).483 Confidential interview (38).484 Confidential interview (21).