C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

307was taken some time in 1999, even shows two similar trucks which had apparently been abandonedbecause they were defective. 1689The photos do not make clear whether the murders had been planned in advance. However, thephotos of bulldozers did lead to additional evidence, for the 5 th Engineer Battalion of the Drina Corpsand other units involved in the digging operations had kept meticulous records of the fuel consumption(with a view to theft) and also of the heavy machinery that was used for trips between the executionsites and the burial sites. 1690 One member of the British intelligence community verified that there wasno Imint on the executions, but there was intelligence about the Muslim fighters who had been takenprisoner and about the start of the flight to Tuzla. It was unclear whether this Imint came from U-2s orsatellites. 1691Albright had personally shown the Dutch deputy military attaché to the PermanentRepresentation at New York, Major E. Koestal, detailed photos which even showed an arm protrudingfrom the ground. These photos were never released, ostensibly because they were consideredunsuitable for publication. 1692 The real reason was that the capabilities of the satellites had to besafeguarded. On 24 August 1995, the Americans responded to further Dutch questions in a SecretNoforn memorandum.When asked when the mass graves were first discovered the US services replied that there wasevidence of digging operations on 2 August. This emerged when an Imint analyst was examining a U-2-film from a mission flown on 27 July. The analyst was studying specific locations on the basis ofHumint (presumably the US Humint source) and intelligence reports from open sources. Hediscovered areas that appeared to indicate the presence of mass graves. A comparison between this andother Imint, taken by a satellite on 13 July, revealed that changes had occurred in the soil structure. Itwas then that the groups of prisoners were discovered on the Imint.The fact that this was not discovered earlier was explained by saying that the people on theground ‘could have been mistaken for vegetation and overlooked where the analyst was not aware ofsubsequent press reports from refugees claiming that people were herded onto soccer fields in the area’.The explanation further stated that there was ‘no usable coverage, however, between 13 and 27 July,because of bad weather or poor image quality – the principal factors affecting whether we havecoverage’. This meant that the Americans only had images of the locations before and after theexecutions and no images of the execution itself. The conclusion was that the people in the footballstadium had probably been executed shortly after 13 July. 1693 This was confirmed by an official at theUS intelligence community. 1694On 28 August, the Minister of Defence was briefed at the Defence Crisis Management Centreon the basis of this analysis. In addition to Voorhoeve, the Chief of Defence Staff and his deputy werepresent. The Director-General of Political Affairs was also invited to attend. 1695 In an interview MinisterVoorhoeve said that, during the briefing, he had asked the Americans if they had more photos datingfrom before the fall of the enclave. He was told that this would be looked into. 1696 Voorhoeve againraised the question of whether there were more satellite photos when he met his American counterpart,Perry, on 5 October 1995. Perry told him that he had closely studied the Imint and Sigint and thatthough these did not provide conclusive evidence of mass executions, there were certainly indications1689 ICTY, Krstic Case, Case IT-98-33-T, OTP Exhibits, No. 160/4.1690 Mirko Klarin, ‘Analysis: Danube surrenders Kosovo Cover-up evidence’, IWPR’s TRIBUNAL UPDATE No. 223, PartI, May 28-June 2, 2001.1691 Confidential interview (8).1692 Interview with E. Koestal, 24/02/00.1693 MoD, DCBC, box 61, No. 2850, American memorandum, 24/08/95.1694 Confidential information (57).1695 NMFA, DGPZ, Memorandum from Acting DAV to DGPZ, 23/08/95. At the bottom was written: "This will alsoprovide an opening to push the United States for the release of any additional photographic material (vide dzz memo dd.15/8)". This took place on 31 August. See: NMFA, DDI DAV 999.241. Letter from J. Vos to T. Dornbush, 31/08/95.1696 Interview with J.J.C. Voorhoeve, 13/03/97.