C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

187from the enclave a total of 140 Canadian UN soldiers, six members of the Dutch reconnaissance party,six UNCivPol workers, two UNMOs and four Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) workers with Sea Stallionhelicopters was covered in great detail. The code name of the plan was Operation Royal Castor/BlueJay. It described on a minute-by-minute basis how, from takeoff to landing in Brindisi, Italy, a total of158 people would be removed from the enclave in a secret night-time operation in a matter of fewhours. Different scenarios were considered, including one in which the operation would be carried outin a moderately to highly hostile environment. The Joint Task Force Two together with US SpecialForces were to carry out the operation. 989On 24 February, the Special Forces arrived in Zagreb and were brought to a state of readiness.An air fleet of 2 C-130 Gunships and a few F-18s were to provide close air support and the operationwas to start at 18.00 hours. The mission was flown from the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and from theair force base Brindisi (Italy). Bouchard received instructions that the Dutch were not allowed to cometo Dorval and Mirabel, but they would be taken along. In the meantime, Canbat had started with theexpansion of the night-time APC patrols, so that neither the ABiH nor the VRS would be alarmed byCanadians driving around in the dark. In total, five people were informed of the entire operation, butotherwise it was a completely American-Canadian affair, in which UNPROFOR was entirelyuninvolved. The expectation was that there would be approximately fifteen deaths.The plan was sent to Visoko. A Canadian officer, whom Moore sent to Srebrenica with an aidconvoy as a courier, carried the secret operation plan on his body. On 2 March, this officer returnedfrom Srebrenica, after speaking extensively with Commander Bouchard about the operation. On 3March, the official handover to Dutchbat took place; one day later, the Canadian compound inSrebrenica was blocked by five hundred ABiH soldiers. Canbat was accused in a hostile atmosphere ofpermitting the VRS lines to be advanced. The VRS also stepped up the pressure and refused to allowthe convoy that had come to collect Canbat access to the enclave. 990 On 5 March 1994, the ABiHsurrounded the compound again, this time with more than 2000 people. 991After this news, Ottawa decided to execute the plan. Apparently only Canbat was to beevacuated, and there were no plans to take along the Dutch reconnaissance unit. The evacuation ofCanbat was to be carried out with helicopters, and furthermore the aircraft carrier Saratoga wasstanding by. Bouchard told the Dutch that he had developed a plan involving close air support and teargas to clear a path out of the enclave. 992 He gave the impression of being under severe stress in thosedays. 993 On 7 March, everyone was ready and the special operation should have taken place, butultimately it was abandoned at the last moment, because the VRS lifted the blockade and Canbat couldleave by road after all. 994 Canbat was therefore able to leave the enclave without intervention, althoughit was a close shave. 995The evacuation of the Canadian battalion appeared to be problematic and raises the question ofwhether similar plans also existed for Dutchbat. According to the Chief of Staff of BHC, GeneralBrinkman, the evacuation of Dutch units was never seriously discussed. The grip on the UN troopswas actually extremely loose. The headquarters in Sarajevo was not a normal headquarters, and therewas not even any formal transfer of authority over the troops. All the national governments maintainedvarying degrees of frequent contact with their own units in the field. They also took their own measures989 Confidential information (17).990 UNGE, UNPROFOR. Declassified by DND, Briefing Note for COS J3, 07/03/94 and ‘serbs stall Canadian withdrawal’,The Toronto Star, 04/03/94.991 ‘Bosnian Muslims want Canadian troops to stay’, The Toronto Star, 07/03/94 and Interview with Yvan Bouchard,15/11/99. Further: Confidential information (18).992 Canadian AIA, Relief in Place, p. 95.993 Jellema, First-In, pp. 105-106.994 Interview with D. Moore, 15/11/99. See also: ‘Canadian convoy heads to Srebrenica’ The Toronto Star, 09/03/94.995 NMFA, Embassy Ottawa, Fietelaars to Foreign Affairs, no. 046, 22/04/94.