C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

360confirmation that the ABiH intercepts released later were not in real time. And again, the reports ofJAC, Molesworth as studied by the author also did not contain any reference to these intercepts.To summarize: American, British, Canadian and perhaps other agencies did have someindications of troop movements and the relocation of equipment, but did not conclude from this that alarge-scale attack was imminent. If something was about to happen, then it would be a limitedoperation. The warning from the DIS to the MIS/Army was on a confidential, personal basis. It is alsoquite possible that all this ‘prior knowledge’ was first established after the event and that the indicationswere not signalled in time in July. After all, Srebrenica was not assigned high priority. Then there is theanalysis of the Canadian intelligence cell at DND, made at the end of June, that an attack wasimminent. How can this be explained? To begin with this information came from a single source andcan be confirmed nowhere else. One possible explanation is that the Canadian analysts had access tothe same intelligence as did their US and British colleagues but took a different view of it and drewdifferent conclusions. It is also possible that the Canadian unit in Bosnia made an extra nationalcontribution which tipped the general analysis of the situation in a different direction. Anotherpossibility is that the Canadians may have followed developments in Eastern Bosnia more closely. TheAmerican and the French concentrated mostly on Sarajevo and the British mostly on Gorazde. 2033One of the political advisers to Akashi, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, noted that at theend of June attention was directed mostly at Sarajevo and Gorazde. 2034 However, the involved Canadiananalysts failed to impress the significance of their findings on their superiors, who rejected theiranalysis. The latter apparently continued to adhere to the general view of the Western intelligencecommunity that no VRS attack would take place. This is also indicated by a Canadian intelligenceanalysis of 11 July, which still did not expect that Mladic would try to take the enclave. It was thoughtthat the VRS would probably concentrate on limiting the abilities of the ABiH to conduct operationsfrom the enclave. 2035If the Bosnian Muslims were unable to share intelligence because their Sigint was not in realtime, then did Western intelligence services gather relevant Sigint? As concluded in Chapter 5, highlevelintercepts did indeed exist. The NSA will have concentrated mostly on international politicaldevelopments. The question as to whether these intercepts also contained important tactical militaryintelligence on the attack must, in all be probability, be answered in the negative. The NSA did notassign the eastern enclaves high priority either. This also went for GCHQ, which focused on Gorazde,and the French DRM, which was mostly interested in Sarajevo. The head of the French militaryintelligence service, General Heinrich, confirmed that his service had only limited sources. Thecapabilities that his service had were concentrated in the zones for which the French troops wereresponsible. ‘We had very few exchanges with the British and no relations with the Dutch at thattime.’ 2036 In fact, during the fall of Srebrenica the DRM was reportedly totally unaware of what washappening. 2037Furthermore, the Comint coverage in Eastern Bosnia was poor. The VRS had imposed strictcommunications security and observed the radio silence conscientiously; the communications that theNSA was nonetheless able to intercept were uneven; due to a lack of analysis and translation capacity theywill have landed in the ‘pending but not urgent pile’. What remained were often items of Elint. Moreover,the history of the exchange of Sigint is not exactly encouraging. Since 1945 this liaison has never beenoptimal, and the exchange of important diplomatic and military Comint between the troop-contributing2033 Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.2034 Interview with Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, 06/06/97.2035 Confidential information (78).2036 Assemblee Nationale, Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre, Assemblee Nationale, No 3412, 2 parts, Paris 2001, Part 2,Audition de Jean Heinrich, 08/02/01, p. 186 and ‘US not keen to nab Bosnian Serb leaders in 1996: French general’, AFPpress release, 08/02/01.2037 Assemblee Nationale, Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre, Assemblee Nationale, No 3412, 2 parts, Paris 2001, Part 2,Audition de M. Bernard Janvier, Remark by Member of Parliament Lamy, 21/06/01.