C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

240these points. They proposed setting up a reception and transmission installation at a number of OPs inthe enclave. This involved equipment with the format of two ‘samsonite’ suitcases. One suitcase wasfor interception of the traffic, and the other provided a direct link to an Inmarsat satellite. Theintercepted messages would be shared with the MIS. In exchange for this cooperation the MIS was alsooffered other ‘broad’ intelligence, taken to mean also Imagery Intelligence.For Dutchbat, then about to depart for Srebrenica, it would be easy to take along a fewsuitcases. The Bosnian Serbs would not be suspicious because these looked like normalcommunications equipment. The Dutch could decide for themselves how many of these suitcases theyinstalled and how many hours a day the equipment would be operated. Two or three soldiers of theElectronic Warfare Company would need to operate the equipment and the Americans would providea brief training course. Three men would provide round-the-clock coverage. The suitcases would belarger in size than the ‘satellite Communication-M’ system that had been in service with theNetherlands Army since 1994 and weighed less than 7 kg. The system was usable globally and veryuser-friendly. 1268Kok first took this request to a member of the Intelligence & Security Section of theMIS/Army. He asked whether this was a realistic option in technical terms. The official in questionconfirmed to the author when asked that Kok had talked to him about the American offer forprovision of a ‘sort of box’. This official thought it was an excellent idea; in his view it would even bepossible to camouflage the suitcases. 1269 Another official within the MIS/CO had also heard about thisAmerican request. He believed it concerned boxes in which Sigint equipment was hidden. He knewnothing about suitcases, but that was not unusual. Kok always kept such matters concealed from hissubordinates. 1270Kok then approached the head of the MIS/Army, H. Bosch, with this proposal. This waslogical since all matters regarding intelligence and the operations of Dutchbat were the responsibility ofthe Army. Kok went together with Bosch to the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Couzy.The latter was not happy about the idea, however. Couzy said he could not remember the reason forthis visit. 1271 Bosch, who was to establish a good relationship with Kok, could not remember thisincident either. He declared emphatically however that he had full confidence in Kok’s account. Bosch,a great advocate of Comint, later tried to convince Couzy again about the usefulness of deploying anElectronic Warfare unit in the enclave, but Couzy rejected this proposal too. 1272The CIA, also acting on behalf of the NSA, is said to have asked five or six times betweenMarch 1994 and January 1995 whether the MIS would cooperate in this project. Kok always had toreply in the negative. 1273 Kok was to try five times to get approval from the MIS/Army for this idea. Hetried again with Bosch’s successor as Head of MIS/Army, Colonel H. Bokhoven. According toBokhoven, Kok passed this request to him just once; he could not recall that Kok said that he had beenapproached by the CIA several times. Kok presented this to Bokhoven as a ‘spectacular’ proposal, butBokhoven considered that the MIS should not cooperate in this project. He viewed it as an offensiveintelligence task that did not fit the context of UNPROFOR, and also felt it was more suitable for theintelligence services of other countries. Bokhoven confirmed to the author that he had refused tocooperate in the installation of these Comint devices in the enclave.Bokhoven’s view was based on his experiences in UNPROFOR: he was afraid that the BosnianSerbs would discover the purpose of the suitcases and this would compromise him. Kok claimed thatfollowing positioning of the suitcases The Hague would receive more American intelligence, butBokhoven still viewed the risk as too great. Bokhoven informed Couzy of the matter. According to1268 See: MoD, MoD LL. Internal memorandum from G-6 OPS/BLS, no. OPS/BLS/1997/6927, 27/06/97.1269 Confidential interview (22).1270 Confidential interview (25).1271 Interview with H.A. Couzy, 04/10/01.1272 Interview with J.M.J. Bosch, 10/10/01.1273 Confidential interview (78).