C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

265to headquarters. The Comint operators often – but not always – made a note of the date and time ofthe intercepts. 1394 The conclusion is that though some phone calls and VHF channels may have beenmonitored ‘live’, the bulk of the very extensive military traffic of the VRS was tape-recorded and wasnot analysed until later. This undermined cohesion and meant that VRS communication that wasactually intercepted in real time could not be placed in the right context. For the Electronic WarfareUnits to have operated in real time the Bosnian national security service in Okresanica would haveneeded a staff of at least 120 while the ABiH units would have needed at least 210 people in bothOkresanica and Konjuh. The very fact the Electronic Warfare Units existed implies, however, that theymust have delivered valuable intelligence from time to time, but this will only have been a drop in theocean compared with the huge flow of Bosnian-Serb communications. It may be safely assumed thatthe VRS used more than a hundred walkie-talkies during the attack. Given the number of availablepersonnel, there can never have been any question of large-scale real-time intelligence.In summary, we can draw certain conclusions about the Bosnian efforts regarding Sigint. Tobegin with, intelligence is useless (except in hindsight) if the information is not presented to theconsumer promptly in a form that is both understandable and usable. If the intelligence is not reportedor is kept secret for fear of compromising the source, then there is no point in collecting it, except forlater use or storage in an archive. Taking the Bosnian efforts as a whole, it must be concluded that theservice responsible for the Sigint was simply too undermanned (ten people per station) and too poorlyequipped to fulfil its mission adequately. Though there were many intercepts, the processing, analysisand reporting were totally inadequate. Intercepts were not typed out immediately in a word-processingprogramme but transcribed by hand in a logbook; tapes bearing messages were re-used and hardly anyuse was made of computers to process and disseminate the data flow.Moreover, there were no Comint analysts at the interception stations to analyse the messagesand assess their value. There were no secure lines with various regional ABiH headquarters and noindications that the Bosnian services had any intelligence analysts at brigade, corps or higher level whowere able to swiftly integrate the Comint with, say, Humint. Even if Bosnia had had the political will topublish the most volatile intercepts worldwide, it would never have succeeded because the intelligencestructure was simply not geared for this. Even the real-time intercepts were too fragmented. There is,furthermore, no evidence that the ABiH Comint service shared intelligence with Dutchbat, westernservices or UNPROFOR.Or was there near-real-time intelligence after all?Nonetheless, an ABiH general claimed that the messages were actually intercepted and analysed in realtime. 1395 This assertion should, however, be treated with the utmost scepticism. If the Bosnian Muslimsdid have real-time Comint then why did they not use it? According to an US intelligence official, thiswould have been the ‘best PR stunt ever’, and the Bosnian Muslims could have screamed ‘bloody helland murder’. He suspected that the ABiH simply did not have real-time capacity. He offered thefollowing example. If, in the best-case scenario, the ABiH had had 150 people in Konjuh, some ofthem would have had friends or even family in the enclave or in the column. Keeping the Comintunder wraps would have triggered a ‘stampede’ among the staff in Okresanica, Konjuh or Tuzla forthey would have done everything possible to save these people. According to this official, the ‘absenceof a stampede’ implies ‘an absence of real-time intercepts’. In his opinion, the ABiH did not knowabout the contents of the intercepts until weeks, months, or even years after the fall of Srebrenica. IfABiH intercepts were to have any influence on military and political measures, they should have beenavailable on the evening of 10 July at the latest.1394 Judgement in the Krstic Trial, § 107, p. 40.1395 Confidential information (38).