C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

345offensive was stopped before the ultimatum. An US diplomat later spoke to one of Akashi’s politicaladvisers, John Almstrom. He recounted that the offensive with 100 to 200 soldiers had been halted at1pm. Janvier had sent the warning to Mladic at 6pm but, Almstrom remarked that ‘it was not anultimatum’. Since no deadline had been set, no answer had been received until then. Almstrom wassurprised that the VRS had attacked from just one side, had used such a small force and had suddenlystopped its advance for no apparent reason. He concluded that the VRS simply wanted to exertpressure and did not plan to take Srebrenica: ‘Perhaps the worst is over.’ 1941Janvier declared later that in view of the small size of the VRS force he did not expect that theVRS would try to take Srebrenica or one of the other enclaves. ‘What would they do with them if theydid?’ he wondered. Janvier regarded the action more as a signal to Sarajevo to show what the VRS wascapable of. Furthermore the VRS offensive could in part be prompted by recent ABiH sorties in whicha Serb village had been destroyed. 1942 This shows that Janvier was not aware that on the evening of 9July Mladic had decided to take the entire enclave. This is also indicated by the diary entries of themilitary assistant to the deputy FC, Major David Last. On 9 July at 11pm a further briefing took placein Zagreb. The US intelligence officer Morgan informed those present that the VRS was not aiming tocause the collapse of the enclave: ‘The BSA [VRS] was moving from the West’. The ABiH wasresponsible for the tense situation due to the sorties from the enclave: ‘This incident was triggered bythe ABiH attacks.’ The events were local, but tank bombardments had taken place in Zepa and thecrisis could well start there too.A briefing for Janvier was held on 10 July at 10am. Last noted in his diary that it was aroundmid-morning that Zagreb began to fear the worst. They still had no idea of the VRS aims. ‘BSA [VRS]is unworldly in their logic.’ On 10 July at around 3pm Zagreb began to suspect that Srebrenica wouldfall. The deputy G-2, Commander Morgan, reported that the attack had originally been a local initiativebut had now become VRS policy. It was only on 11 July at 11am that Janvier realized that the issue atstake was the conquest of the entire enclave. Until then two options had constantly been applied: alimited attack or the conquest of the enclave. It was not yet clear in Zagreb which option was beingfollowed. Late in the morning of 11 June Janvier concluded that the attack was aimed at the entire1943enclave. Lieutenant Colonel Baxter, the military assistant to General Smith, passed on the latestintelligence at 4.50pm. Dutchbat had withdrawn to Potocari, where more than 20,000 DisplacedPersons had gathered. The NATO liaison officer announced that the situation was very poor and ‘theenclave was lost’. 1944On 10 July the situation in Srebrenica was discussed during informal consultations in theSecurity Council. The representative of the Secretary-General, C. Gharekhan, briefed the membersabout the latest developments. He reported that the ABiH had attacked a Dutch APC. According toAlbright the Security Council should first have additional information before conclusions could bedrawn. In response to her question about Close Air Support, Gharekhan stated that the commanderson the ground could request this if their troops were endangered. He declared, nota bene, that ‘there hadnot yet been any requests for close air support’. 1945 If Gharekhan really said this on 10 July, then itwould seem that he informed the Security Council wrongly. Indeed, earlier on that day Karremans hadalready made various CAS requests.In the Balkan IntSum of the JAC at Molesworth on 10 July it was reported that air strikes hadbeen threatened if the VRS continued with attacks. The prediction for the next 24 to 96 hours was thatthe VRS attack on Srebrenica and Zepa would be continued with a possible escalation around Zepa. Inan analysis the JAC concluded that despite the threats it was unlikely that air strikes were imminentabove all because the VRS had taken Dutch soldiers hostage. Boutros Ghali had spoken out in support1941 Confidential information (71).1942 Confidential information (72).1943 MoD, DAB. Notes of the meeting regarding the fall of Srebrenica, 01/11/95.1944 Interview with David Last, 02/07/00.1945 Confidential information (73).