C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

45verification flights by unmanned espionage aircraft, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),provided the UN monitors all warring factions. The combatants will also find supervision throughintelligence easier to accept if they know that all parties are subject to the same strict supervisionregime. This can have a stabilizing effect. The situation was more difficult in Bosnia, whereUNPROFOR was often seen as an organization that took sides with the Bosnian Muslims. Erikssonpoints out that the UN’s response to ABiH operations from the eastern enclaves was less ‘hard’ than itsresponse to operations carried out by the VRS. 179Hugh Smith feels that ‘the need for intelligence is being increasingly felt by both the UN and bystates contributing to peacekeeping operations. Particularly in more complex and fluid situations,intelligence will be crucial in achieving the goals of the mission as laid down by the UN SecurityCouncil.’ This need has grown steadily, and Smith believes that it will continue to do so in the future,because ‘peacekeepers are liable to find themselves in countries in which no government is inundisputed control, social order has broken down or is on the point of collapse. Sometimes hostilitiesare under way or imminent, and the use of force against peacekeepers is a manifest possibility’. 180Several Force Commanders and Deputy Force Commanders who were quoted in thisintroductory chapter concluded that during their UNPROFOR period they had no usable and timelyintelligence at their disposal. They were therefore of the opinion that the UN Secretariat in New Yorkneeds an independent intelligence analysis unit, because otherwise the organization will not be able tofulfil its tasks within the framework of preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping. An US intelligenceofficial agreed that the infrastructure in Zagreb was far from ideal in providing timely, useableintelligence. Security was always a pain, and finding some quiet corner to speak to the decision-makerwas often very difficult. Apart from that, none of the crucial intelligence came from UN sources, andmost of it could not be conveyed within the UN communications architecture. Commanders in Zagreb(and Sarajevo) were unable to convey key pieces of intelligence or even operational informationsecurely to their field commanders who had an immediate need to know it. 181The UN is now sometimes forced to intervene as a result of provocation or manipulation byone of the warring parties (sometimes supported by the press). For instance, an effectivedisinformation campaign by the Bosnian Muslims in April 1994 during the siege of Gorazde provokedNATO air strikes - an excellent example of manipulation of the UN by one of the warring factions, andone which could possibly have been prevented by independent analysis. 182 The lack of regularintelligence gathering by UNPROFOR in Bosnia led to a situation in which various international andnational intelligence and security services took matters into their own hands. The undesirableconsequences for the peacekeeping operation briefly outlined above were innumerable.179 Pär Eriksson, ‘Intelligence and Peacekeeping Operations’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 10(1997) 1, p. 17.180 Hugh Smith, ‘Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, Vol. 36 (1994) 3, pp. 174-175.181 Confidential information (80).182 Robert J. Allen, ‘Intelligence Support for Peace Operations’, Pickert, Intelligence, pp. 114-115.