C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

2953. With whom was imagery intelligence shared?Imint was used from the very start of the conflict in Bosnia. In August 1992, Newsday accused the BushAdministration of deliberately withholding evidence of prison camps and executions of Muslims andCroats. Imint from Keyhole satellites was said to have delivered proof of this. Originally, the USintelligence services had purportedly even refused to use U-2s to take a closer look at the concentrationcamps. This was considered ‘too provocative’. Earlier revelations by Newsday supposedly led to theclearance of camps which had been identified by Imint. After criticism from presidential candidateClinton, Bush declared that he had ordered the intelligence community ‘to use every asset’ to trackdown war crimes in Bosnia. 1590The US diplomat Ron Neitzke confirmed that Imint was available in 1992. 1591 The newspaperThe Guardian managed to lay its hands on a report of a secret briefing by the CIA and NSA from lateMay 1992, in which Imint was shown of the VRS artillery around Sarajevo. 1592 In 1993, satellite photoswere also used to ascertain the precision of the American food droppings by C-130s. 1593 The fact thatthe Americans were gathering Imint on the prison camps came to light at the start of 1993 when theUS negotiator Cyrus Vance was handed a list of camps which had been compiled partly from satellitephotos and partly from Humint. 1594 Special aircraft were also deployed for photo reconnaissance abovethe enclaves. The subsequent intelligence was then shared with NATO. The Chairman of the MilitaryCommittee, Sir Richard Vincent, told NATO in January 1994 for example that detailed airreconnaissance was being carried out above Bosnia and that NATO now had a large database of thepositions of the warring factions. Closer attention would now be paid to air reconnaissance above theenclaves of Srebrenica and Tuzla. 1595 No doubt Vincent made this promise because he was aware of thedifficult predicament of the Canadian battalion at that time. The handover to Dutchbat was beingimpeded by the VRS and the ABiH, and a plan was being considered to send in US and CanadianSpecial Forces to extract the Canadians from the enclave by force (see Chapter 4). Probably, thesephotos were taken by normal NATO air reconnaissance planes and not by specialized aircraft such asthe U-2. 1596The Imint was shared within NATO through a heavily protected communication networkknown as the Linked Operational Intelligence Center Europe (LOCE) system. The results of imagery,electronic and other types of intelligence were exchanged through the LOCE system. In principle, U-2Imint went to all NATO members, but often analyses (‘read-outs’) were distributed instead of photos.Initially, Satint could only be released to the US Secretary of State or a four-star general at the head ofthe US EUCOM. 1597 Later, U-2 and other Imint arrived more often via LOCE. However, in the earlystages of the Balkan War, LOCE registered no Imint. Presumably only the Canadian services had directaccess to this. Inevitably, the fact that no Satint was shared with most European allies often led tocomplaints within NATO. Keith Hall, Director of the NRO, pushed for more comprehensive sharingwith the European allies, but diplomats expected that this would be met by protests from the rest ofthe US intelligence community and Congress. 1598A military analyst of the MIS/Air Force who worked in Villafranca between 1 April and 1October 1995 said that he received Imint in Villafranca, but there was no way of determining whether itcame from a U-2 or a satellite. Experts claim that U-2 imagery was of a better resolution. Nevertheless,it is often claimed that the Imint was made a bit fuzzier to conceal the actual resolution. However, this1590 K. Royce and P. Sloyan, ‘ The U.S. waited back in June, CIA told Bush officials of atrocities’, Newsday, 15/08/92.1591 Cohen, Hearts grown brutal, p. 173.1592 Ed Vulliamy, ‘US feud sealed Bosnia’s fate’, The Guardian, 20/05/96.1593 Tony Capaccio, ‘Bosnia Airdrop’, Air Force Magazine, July 1993, p. 56.1594 Confidential information (52).1595 Confidential information (53).1596 For the history of the U-2 see: Van der Aart, Spionage vanuit de lucht, pp. 28-45.1597 Confidential interview (54).1598 Joseph Fitchett, ‘spying From Space: U.S. to Sharpen the Focus’, International Herald Tribune, 10/04/01.