C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

241Bokhoven Couzy supported him in his rejection of the offer. 1274 It is remarkable that Couzy canremember nothing of this. He could not recall ever having been approached by Kok, Bosch orBokhoven about this matter. He could also not recall whether he had ever gone to Ter Beek orVoorhoeve with this proposal. Couzy did however tell the author that Kok could have stuck to hisguns and have had him overruled by the Chief of the Defence Staff. This clearly did not happen. 1275In November 2002 both Defence ministers testified before the Dutch Parliamentary Inquiryinto Srebrenica that they were never approached regarding the Sigint suitcases. Both ministers claimedthat they would have gone along with this operation. 1276 Former Minister Voorhoeve had earlier alreadyconfirmed to the author that he had never received the suitcases proposal. Asked whether he wouldhave cooperated, in view of the poor information situation of Dutchbat, Voorhoeve answered: ‘Yes,certainly. The non-defensible position of Dutchbat, and what could happen, caused me to lose sleepfrom the moment I took office.’ 1277 The Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence, M. Patijn, hadnever received information about a request from a foreign intelligence service either. 1278 In 2001Bokhoven still held the opinion that it would not have been possible to keep this operation properlyconcealed or secret. Even if the suitcases had been camouflaged as normal communications equipment,he thought the Bosnian Serbs would have discovered them and then the equipment would not havereached the enclave. Bokhoven was, and remained, convinced on the basis of his earlier experience inBosnia that the VRS would have discovered the suitcases. As an example he cited the special encryptioncommunications equipment of the British Joint Commission Observers (JCO) unit in the easternenclaves. He said that these devices had been brought into the enclave secretly by land or air and notvia the normal route in convoys or suchlike, as they would otherwise have been discovered. 1279Bokhoven is mistaken here however: the British JCO unit had taken along its own communicationsequipment in its Land Rovers.For Bokhoven the risk of this secret operation failing seemed real. The secure encryptionequipment could then have fallen into hands of the ABiH or the VRS. The only way of transporting thesuitcases without drawing attention to them would have been for Dutchbat I to take them along whenall other communications equipment went to the enclave. Discovery of the equipment during thepresence of Dutchbat would not have been a major problem. If the equipment threatened to fall intothe hands of one of the warring factions, it could simply have been destroyed.Kok finally visited Couzy again with the American request, but on the advice of Bokhoven thelatter refused, as recounted, to provide his cooperation. Couzy did not want the MIS to carry out anyintelligence or Sigint operations regarding Srebrenica; this related to the fact that Couzy was notparticularly intelligence-minded. 1280 Kok did not give up however and made a second direct attemptwith Couzy, but the latter once again rejected the idea: no spying for the Americans, he said; this was apeacekeeping mission and not a war. He was not receptive to the Force Protection argument, and thelikelihood that this exchange would, in Kok’s view, result in much intelligence on a quid pro quo basis.Kok continued to insist this involved equipment of a modest scale would not endanger Dutchbat.Couzy stuck to his previously adopted standpoint: he wanted a strict separation between strategic andoperational intelligence. Couzy could not recall anything about this visit either. The possibility that theMIS/Army, responsible for gathering operational military intelligence, would benefit from such anoperation was not regarded by Couzy as an argument of sufficient importance.1274 Interview with H. Bokhoven, 16/05/01. From April 1994 to December 1995 he was Head of the MIS/Army. Beforethis in 1993 and 1994 he was Plan Officer in UNPROFOR under General J. Cot.1275 Interview with H.A. Couzy, 04/10/01.1276 Testimonies by Relus ter Beek, 14/11/02 and Joris Voorhoeve, 28/11/02.1277 Interview with J.J.C. Voorhoeve, 01/10/01.1278 Interview with M. Patijn, 28/08/00.1279 Interview with H. Bokhoven, 16/05/01.1280 Interview with A. Bleumink, 19/03/01.