C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

2685. UNPROFOR and Dutchbat as a target for Communications IntelligenceAs already mentioned in a previous chapter, according to an article published in the Dutch newspaperHet Parool, ‘During the conflict in Bosnia, Sarajevo was a hive of espionage. Everyone was spying oneveryone else: the warring factions and the countries of the UN peace force.’ Het Parool reported in1998 that the telephone of General Rose was being tapped not only by one of the allies but by theMuslims as well. 1410 The Chief-of-Staff under General Rose, General A.P.P.M. van Baal, also confirmedthat the residence of Bosnia-Hercegovina Command in Sarajevo was bugged. This building, Tito’sformer country retreat, was filled with bugging devices. Furthermore, the two lower storeys of anoutbuilding were being used by the Bosnian intelligence services. Van Baal said that General Rosesometimes called out – for a joke – that an attack was pending. Shortly afterwards, a call would comefrom ABiH headquarters claiming that an attack was underway. 1411UNPROFOR communications were a key target for all warring factions (VJ, VRS and ABiH).As far as Comint operations of the VRS in and around Sarajevo are concerned, virtually all theconversations between UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo and Zagreb and the leaders of theBosnian Government were intercepted. But the Bosnian national security services and the ABiH werenot sitting idle either. In November 1994, during the Bihac crisis, the Bosnian Muslims interceptedphone calls between General Rose and the political advisor of Karadzic, Jovan Zametica. 1412 Theprevious chapter has already addressed the fact that UN telephones and faxes were insufficientlyprotected against interception. Sometimes interception was not even necessary and the VRS and theABiH got direct access to the UNPROFOR communications network due to internal errors at the UN. 1413In addition, the Bosnian intelligence services had been heavily infiltrated by the Serb militaryintelligence service. The Serbs had realized before the conflict broke out that the federal intelligenceservices would disintegrate. Hence, the Chief of the Federal Intelligence Services (KOS), AleksandarVasiljevic, started up an operation aimed at infiltrating various sections of the Bosnian secret service.He is thought to have succeeded in the case of the Bosnian military intelligence service (VOS) and theBosnian civil intelligence service (AID). The VRS intelligence service probably received furtherassistance from the Serb Foreign Ministry (MUP), which had its own satellite monitoring station inBelgrade. The main targets of the MUP were the UNPROFOR and NATO communications that ranvia Inmarsat and/or Intelsat. Here, the VRS was doubly successful: the Bosnian military intelligenceservice led by Brigadier-General Mustafa Hajrulahovic permanently listened in to UNPROFORheadquarters and all international telephone calls. As the VRS, in turn, intercepted the communicationsof the Muslims, it also had access to these intercepts. 1414This is how the VRS discovered through Comint that a senior UNPROFOR official had strucka deal with a prominent Bosnian minister. During the negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs theUNPROFOR official would try to get the access routes re-opened for humanitarian convoys toSarajevo. A member of General Smith’s staff heard this from VRS liaison officer, Major Milenko Indjic,and reported it to his superior. Smith disbelieved it at first, but it was quickly confirmed by another UNworker who had heard the same thing from the secretary of the Bosnian minister. In return for keepingthe access routes open for four days a sizeable sum of money would be deposited in the UNPROFORofficial’s Swiss bank account. The Bosnian minister had already transferred substantial sums into thisaccount. The Bosnian but also Bosnian-Serb mafia was namely making a fortune from the humanitarian1410 ‘sarajevo zat vol spionnen in oorlog’ (Sarajevo full of spies during war), Het Parool, 24/04/98.1411 Interview with A.P.P.M. van Baal, 27/05/98.1412 Rose, Fighting for Peace, pp. 203 - 204.1413 Confidential collection (7), UNPROFOR Outgoing Fax, C. White to Sector Sarajevo, no. 007, 27/02/95.1414 In Croatia this operation was known as Operation Labrador. MoD, MIS, File 438-0190, box 307, Memorandum: TheBosnian civil intelligence service AID, 07/05/97.