C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

292national intelligence authorities. This was demonstrated when a Dutch aerial photo showed a Frenchreconnaissance plane in an area where it had no right to be. 1569The last flight of the 306 th Squadron (mission 1357), which was stationed in Villafranca and incharge of photo reconnaissance missions above Bosnia, dates from 27 May 1995. The activities on thewestern side were more or less stopped after the American F-16 of O’Grady was shot down. Thisincident showed that radar signals from were detected by the NSA before it downed the F-16 overBosnia but that the vital intelligence was not relayed to the pilot. The deputy director if the CIAadmitted that the system designed to collect and disseminate intelligence in Bosnia failed. 1570 AnAmerican U-2R aircraft, operating on behalf of the NSA, picked up SA-6 missile radar transmissionson and off for almost 3 hours before the shootdown. If this intelligence had been timely forwardedO’Grady would have had time to get out of the area, according to the chairman of the JCS, GeneralJohn Shalikasvili. 1571In fact, no reconnaissance flights on behalf of UNPROFOR were carried out at all between 11and 30 June. Apparently, it was considered too dangerous to operate after this date, given the mountingthreat from the Bosnian-Serb anti-aircraft systems. During the war in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs andSerbs often fired their guided missiles without radar. If the flight route was roughly known, the VRScould adjust its anti-aircraft systems accordingly. The VRS radar was usually switched off out of fear ofUS HARM missiles. Another factor was that the VRS and the JNA had an integrated air-defencesystem, especially for early warning tasks. The JNA had also positioned air missiles along the Drina tosupport the VRS. These were also activated in the summer of 1995 during the operations against theeastern enclaves. Most of the time, the VRS worked with mobile missile launchers, which they movedaround. The Dutch reconnaissance flights were not resumed until 2 August 1995 (mission 1358). 1572Unlike France, the Netherlands did not carry out independent missions (outside UNPROFOR andNATO) above Bosnia. 1573The limitations of ImintThough the Imint capacity of satellites, spy planes and UAVs appears impressive, it should not beoverestimated. The claims of the French newspaper La Croix that the CIA even followed the murders‘live’ on large screens in its Observation Room must be consigned to the realm of fantasy. 1574 Usually,there is no real-time Imint from satellites; there is only near-real-time intelligence. An explanation forthis is the following. Near real time translates into available on the ground in 10 minutes, analysedsometime later, ranging from tens of minutes for US National Command priorities like destruction ofArafat’s Compound, to several hours, like the sort of priorities discussed here. The dwell time of anyimagery satellite from horizon to horizon would be less than ten minutes, from start to finish. Evenbest case, ‘live’ only lasts ten minutes, and would only be seen ten minutes after the fact. To do that, thesatellite must pivot for the duration of its view time, looking only at a specific point on the ground. Allother coverage of the theatre would be lost while the satellite stared at the one spot (like Srebrenica) onthe ground. If such a feat were technically possible, which is arguable, it would mean the loss ofhundreds of other targets across the theatre from the central Mediterranean to the Baltic. No onewould imagine that any imagery target in the Eastern Enclaves would warrant that sort of priority. 15751569 Interview J. Schouren, 04/12/99 and Confidential interview (31).1570 Bill Gertz, ‘NATO jet broke radar relay to U.S. pilot, The Washington Times, 28/06/95 and Dana Priest, ‘system FailesDowned Pilot, CIA Official Says, The Washington Post, 28/06/95.1571 ‘Bosnia’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 03/07/95 and Dana Priest, ‘Data Delay Blamed for Plane Loss, TheWashington Post, 12/07/95.1572 Confidential interview (32) and MoD, Archive 306 SQN PI-SECTIE, Overview of all reconnaissance flights aboveBosnia, undated.1573 MoD, DCBC, File 1486, Memorandum from P.C. Berlijn to K. Hilderink, 02/08/96.1574 ‘AICG call to indict General Janvier’, Bosnia Report, No. 1, November-December 1997, p. 3.1575 Confidential information (80).