C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

43any indication of action taken. The immediate effect had been to deny Dallaire permission to conductthe proposed cordon and search. ‘They refused’, said Marchal, ‘because UNAMIR was deployed undera Chapter VImandate, traditional peacekeeping. New York argued that a cordon and search was anoffensive operation for which permission would not be granted’. The Secretary-General was out ofUNHeadquarters for much of January and was not to learn of the signal and recognise its significanceuntil three years later. New York withheld permission for a military operation to capture the weapons.Once the massacres had started, General Dallaire had neither the resources nor the mandate to preventthe planned genocide. 166 The advisor to the Secretary-General, Iqbal Riza, later explained that this wasdue to a feeling of ‘not Somalia again’ in New York, with which he referred to the fear in New Yorkthat peacekeepers would be killed. 167The UN attitude towards active intelligence gathering in peacekeeping operations can beunderstood in the light of a long-standing anti-intelligence culture, but nonetheless it can hardly beconsidered responsible. The increasingly complexity of the situations in which peacekeepers have tooperate, such as internal conflicts in UN member states, means that there is actually a growing need forintelligence. The author David Charters states in no uncertain terms that ‘intelligence is central to theeffectiveness of peacekeeping in the new conflict environment’. 168 Van Kappen is convinced that thelack of strategic intelligence was an important cause of the failure of a number of UN operations. 169 Indoing so, he raises a problem that the UN, as an international organization, has so far been unable tosolve in a structured way.The anarchic or almost anarchic situations which have created this increasing demand for moreand better intelligence are at the same time making it more difficult to acquire and disseminateintelligence. The rapidly changing situations and alliances on the ground are also ensuring thatintelligence gathered by observers on the spot is rapidly out-of-date. Even the ‘old’ establishedintelligence services have the greatest difficulty in keeping up with these developments. The UN musttherefore, according to the author Hugh Smith, formulate a clear answer in the short term to thequestion of which role intelligence should play in future peacekeeping operations, and perhaps also inpreventive diplomacy. After all, he argues, there happens to be a great need for strategic intelligence inorder to understand the political and military situation between the warring parties before the UNbecomes directly involved. There is also a great demand for operational intelligence, which is needed toensure the most effective deployment of resources and manpower for the execution of the mandate.This is especially important with regard to issues that have a fairly fluid political or military context.Finally, tactical intelligence is necessary for the support of ground forces in performing theirpeacekeeping tasks, such as monitoring a ceasefire or a suspension of hostilities.170 The AmericanKenneth Allard, who carried out a study of the peacekeeping operation in Somalia, also arrives at theconclusion that ‘intelligence is as vital to the success of a peace operation as it is to any other militaryactivity’. 171The brief history of the relationship between intelligence and the UN outlined above shows itto be a relationship fraught with difficulties. In any case, it rapidly became clear to the MilitaryIntelligence Service of the Royal Netherlands Army (MIS/Army) that they should expect nothing ofthe UN. In 1995, the memorandum ‘Intelligence Needs of the Ministry of Defence’ rightly observedthat the lack of sufficient security guarantees caused great reluctance among the countries that166 David A. Charters, ‘Out of the Closet: Intelligence Support for Post-Modernist Peacekeeping’, in: The Pearson Papers, no.4, Intelligence and Peacekeeping, Halifax, 1999, p. 52. See also the documents that were declassified on 20/08/01 on:http://www.gwu.edu.167 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 275.168 David A. Charters, ‘Out of the Closet: Intelligence Support for Post-Modernist Peacekeeping’, The Pearson Papers, No. 4,Intelligence and Peacekeeping, Halifax, 1999, p. 61.169 F.E. van Kappen, ‘strategic intelligence and the United Nations’, Militaire Spectator Vol. 170 (2001) 11, p. 594.170 Hugh Smith, ‘Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, Vol. 36 (1994) 3, p. 175.171 Hartcock, The Peace Operations, p. 41.