C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

152‘... suggesting to a foreign country that it might consider a covert actionappeared perfectly legal; going one step further and encouraging a foreigncountry appeared legal but potentially risky from a political standpoint. Actuallysupporting the foreign action through direct participation, the reports said,crosses the line into covert action’.Lake and Christopher rejected Holbrooke’s plan, however; Christopher still feared leaks and angryreactions from London, Ottawa and Paris, which could lead to the departure of UNPROFOR. Lakethought that this was a sort of covert operation anyway, in which case the president and Congress mustbe let into the secret. 741Reactions in the Netherlands and in UNPROFOR to the lifting of the arms embargoMeanwhile, a debate was raging in the US Congress about lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. Thisdebate also did not go unnoticed in various capitals and in UNPROFOR. For instance, NetherlandsPrime Minister Wim Kok told President Clinton by phone of his great concern about the possiblelifting of the arms embargo. Clinton expressed understanding, but pointed to the domestic politicalpressure from Congress for lifting the arms embargo, which he himself called ‘hypocritical’, because inthe event of a unilateral decision it would not be American but other troops who would run largesecurity risks. 742In a gloomy and comprehensive scenario, Akashi outlined from Zagreb the possibleconsequences for the UN peacekeeping operations. The UNPROFOR commanders considered thatlifting the arms embargo could be deemed by the Bosnian Serbs to be a de facto declaration of war bythe international community. This had consequences for the humanitarian efforts and would lead to theVRS stepping up military actions against UNPROFOR. Furthermore, the VRS could feel forced tostart large-scale military operations before the arms reached the ABiH, and UNPROFOR would loseany semblance of impartiality. The VRS would consider lifting the arms embargo to be new evidence ofWestern support to the Bosnian Muslims. Furthermore, the VRS would immediately withdraw its heavyweapons from the Weapon Collection Points in Sarajevo and other areas. 743In the autumn of 1994 there were in fact two tendencies that could be observed. The Americangovernment had to operate more cautiously, to prevent the ‘truth’ about the Iranian connection beingrevealed. At the end of 1994 a wide variety of rumours were circulating that Holbrooke had discussed aplan with foreign officials for Washington to make secret funds and/or arms available to the ABiH. Ahigh American government official was said to have urged the Croatian government to continue certainmilitary supplies to Bosnia. 744Investigation by the Intelligence Oversight BoardHolbrooke’s activities gave Woolsey renewed concerns; in October 1994 he approached Lake again, butagain this had little effect. In the autumn of 1994, Woolsey then approached the Intelligence OversightBoard, a small unit in the White House that is responsible for internal investigation into possible falsesteps within the intelligence community. The reason for Woolsey’s move was that Congress was741 James Risen & Doyle McManus, ‘U.S. had options to let Bosnia get arms’, Los Angeles Times, 14/07/96.742 Archive Cabinet Office, Speaking notes for the prime minister’s telephone conversation with President Clinton,09/09/94 and Letter Kok to Van Mierlo, no. 94G000062, 12/09/94. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked if Kok wantedto broach the subject of lifting the embargo with Clinton himself.743 UNNY, DPKO, File #87306, Box 6. G-3 Plans to DFC, 31/10/94 and UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124. Akashi toStoltenberg and Annan, Z-1646, 02/11/94.744 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence US Senate, U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian and Other Arms Transfers to theBosnian Army, 1994-1995, Washington DC, 1996, p. 4.