C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

203125 linguists to provide translation and interpretation support for US forces in Yugoslavia’. Accordingto the advertisement the work would take place in ‘a hostile, harsh environment’. 1075From 1991 to 1995 NSA was interested in virtually all aspects of the conflict in Bosnia:diplomatic, military and economic. Much emphasis was placed on diplomatic Sigint, i.e. intercepting thecommunications of the Croatian, Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav governments about theconflict and related political issues, as well as the role of various outside governments in the conflict,such as the involvement of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. This was generally referred to as‘strategic Sigint’, much of which was very sensitive in nature. The organization is said, for instance, tohave monitored telephone conversations that the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-DietrichGenscher, conducted with the Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. At the same time, NSA (not themilitary) also collected massive amounts of Sigint about military developments in the region, much of ittactical in nature (such as Croatian Army battalion xx moving from place A to place B), using listeningposts and mobile reconnaissance platforms. In addition to diplomatic and economic, NSA alsomonitored a wide range of other subjects, such as wire transfers coming in and out of the variousformer Yugoslav republics, illicit arms shipments, petroleum smuggling into the former Yugoslavia,terrorist activities, narcotics trafficking, etc. It is probably fair to say that by 1995, the formerYugoslavia was probably the single most important Sigint target for NSA, despite the fact that therewere no American troops yet on the ground. 1076Due to the involvement of the US Air Force and Navy, the NSA also focused on the Serb airdefence in Bosnia. The agency was interested in the military developments on the ground despite thefact that US Ground Forces were not stationed in Bosnia. The NSA supplied intelligence for OperationDeny Flight, in the form of Sigint from the military communications traffic and Elint from Serb airdefence operations. This was fed into the Linked Operational Intelligence Center Europe (LOCE)system. The Americans were interested in the air defence systems of the (Bosnian) Serbs. USintelligence officials indicated, however, that it was not impossible that information on this subject thatwas passed on by the NSA to the Pentagon for further processing then became ‘hung up’ at thePentagon. 1077The deployed American aircraft and satellitesSigint satellites and aircraft formed the chief resource for ‘hoovering up’ the telephone, radio, digitaland analogue computer data, fax and modem transmissions between computers and GSM traffic. Anew generation was in use at this time: the Mercury (Advance Vortex) satellite which is supposedly ableto intercept from space even very low-power radio transmissions, such as those from walkie-talkies. 1078Moreover, between 1994 and 1997 three new Sigint satellites (Trumpet) were launched, intended foramongst others monitoring military targets. Because Trumpet used a special orbit, it could not hoverover designated points on the Earth’s surface as geosynchrenous Sigint satellites do. These satellitescopy primarily civilian traffic. Because of the unique dynamics of these special orbits, the system has noutility for monitoring civilian telecom nets because it passes too quickly over designated points over theEarth; but the system does have great utility against mobile military-type communications and Elintemitters in the northern hemisphere. 10791075 Bamford, Body of Secrets, p. 554. Strangely enough Bamford otherwise writes nothing at all about the Sigint operations inBosnia.1076 E-mail message Matthew Aid to the author, 13/09/02 and confidential information (80). See also: ‘Andreas ZumachResponds to Philips’, in: Covert Action Quarterly (1995-96), 55 p. 59.1077 The head of the Balkan Sigint unit in Stuttgart at that time was Pat Donahue. Confidential interviews (6), (13) and (54).1078 The Mercury also has Electronic Intelligence and Fisint tasks. For the ‘Mercury’ see the FAS Space Policy Project:www.fas.org.1079 Matthew M. Aid, ‘The Time of Troubles: The US NSA in the Twenty-First Century’, in: Intelligence and National Security,Vol. 15 (2000) 3, pp. 13-14 and E-mail Matthew Aid to the author, 13/10/02.