C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

289around Sarajevo and Gorazde. This information was passed on to UNPROFOR for the eventuality ofair attacks on the VRS positions. Croatian Army officers admitted that the success of their offensive inthe Krajina was partly attributable to the information from the Predators. 1547 They appear to havereceived this intelligence from the Americans. Late 1995 the Pentagon pulled its advanced Predatordrones out of Bosnia because they were not equipped with the radar to see through dense Bosniancloud cover. The drones were being flown so low beneath the clouds that they became easy targets forVRS ground fire. It did not take the Bosnian Serbs long to find a fast and effective weapon against lowflyingUAVs. One tactic was to fly an Mi-8 HIP helicopter alongside the UAV. The gunner then shotthe UAV to pieces with a 7.62 mm machine gun through the open side-door. This was a popular tacticduring the war in Kosovo until NAVO fighter planes brought it to an end by firing at thehelicopters. 1548 The CIA declined to discuss whether it also had withdrawn its drones from theBalkans. 1549Besides the UAVs of the CIA, the US marines had their own UAVs, the Navy VC-6 Pioneers,which had been operating from sea and land since 1994, supporting the Sixth Fleet in the Adriatic. Thiswas a short-range and older US Navy aircraft. 1550 Missions were flown over Bosnia from September1994. 1551The deployment of other unmanned aerial vehiclesDid UNPROFOR itself have UAVs at its disposal? The Swedish Force Commander Wahlgren hadalready commented early on that his experience of getting correct and accurate information aboutSrebrenica and Zepa was not always positive. Getting intelligence from NATO was not much of asuccess. He suggested approaching Israel, which had used unmanned Drones for air reconnaissancemissions in the past. UNPROFOR could perhaps buy or borrow some Drones for deployment inBosnia. They were to be allocated to temporary ultra-mobile Drone teams which could be used quicklyin problem areas. 1552 In the summer of 1993, France also had deployable UAVs at its disposal. BrigadierGeneral C. Ritchie, who was working for UNPROFOR in Zagreb, told DPKO in New York as early asat the end of 1993 that intelligence-gathering tests had been conducted with French UAVs. These fiveUAVs were rented from Paris but were only used above Bihac for the benefit of the French troopsstationed there. They flew from Pleso airfield with the consent of Generals Briquemont and Cot. Theirmain task was to monitor troop and artillery movements. 1553As it happened, these UAVs did not perform up to scratch, but despite negativerecommendations, UNPROFOR still rented them for $ 1,000,000 for a period of three months. 1554 Asecond bill arrived at the end of 1993 in which the French company CAC Systèmes chargedUNPROFOR almost $ 253,000 for two UAVs which had crashed. UNPROFOR had doubts as to whowas to blame for the accidents. A problem was, however, pinpointed: UNPROFOR had agreed not tofit UAVs with parachutes. This inevitably meant that the UAVs would crash in the event of problems.So the advice in August 1994 was to pay the bill. 1555 The intelligence product that was eventually1547 David A. Fulgham, ‘Predators bound for Bosnia soon’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13/11/95, p. 73 and MoD,MIS/TCBU. MID/KM Report, UAVs above Bosnia, PIR 95/1, 02/02/95.1548 Lt. Commander J.D.R. Dixon, UAV Employment in Kosovo: Lessons for the Operational Commander, Naval War College paper,08/02/00, p. 10.1549 James Risen and Ralph Vartabedian, ‘spy Plane Woes Create Bosnia Intelligence Gap’, Los Angeles Times, 02/12/95.1550 ‘UAVs in Bosnia’, at: http://www.edwards.af.mil.pmay98/cover/bosnia.htm.1551 See for example: www.fas.org/irp/aganecy/daro/uav95/pioneer.html1552 UNGE, UNPROFOR. Wahlgren to Annan, Unprofor Z-596, 067/05/93.1553 Confidential Collection (4), CoS Unprofor, Zagreb to BHC, Kiseljak, No. C811, 18/11/93.1554 UNGE, DPKO, No. 81307, File DFC Office, Brig. Gen Ritchie, UNPROFOR, Zagreb to Annan, UNPROFOR-Z-1628,Drone Deployment, 23/12/93, 6p.1555 UNNY, DPKO, No. 81307, File DFC Office, 02/08-04/08/95, DFC Crabbe to COS, BHC, DFC 233, 24/08/94 andDFC, Crabbe to COS, BHC, DFC 266, 31/10/94.