C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

262other documents relating to the period from 30 June until the end of July. He revealed that on 14 Julythe ABiH had intercepted VRS orders to kill the men in the column.According to Pargan, the Electronic Warfare Units of the 2 nd Corps were disseminatingdisinformation on 14 July by sending out messages that Oric and his unit had broken the strangleholdon the column. This message triggered a panic in Zvornik, which led to the mobilization of largernumbers of VRS soldiers. As a result, it was even more difficult for the refugees to break through theVRS lines. Intercepts on 14 July revealed that the VRS asked for bulldozers at Konjevic Polje.Intervepts disclosed that a panic had broken out in the VRS ranks about the events. The VRS leadershad no clear idea of what was going on, so they consented to a ceasefire of 24 hours, which wasnegotiated by ABiH Major Semsudin Muminovic. 1382 The actual existence of this Comint could beconstrued from interviews with the commander of the 2 nd Corps, General Sead Delic, the Sigint expertsof the 2 nd Corps, Captain Hajrudin Kisic, the Head of Intelligence of the 2 nd Corps, Major Sefko Tihicand the ABiH commander in Srebrenica, Ramiz Becirovic. It was moreover confirmed by BosnianComint that was placed at the NIOD’s disposal 1383 and by the report by researcher the ICTY researcherRichard Butler, Srebrenica Military Narrative – Operation Krivaja 95, which was specially compiled for theYugoslavia Tribunal.The question at the Tribunal was, however, if the information from the interviews was accurate,and if the ABiH troops were not bluffing about their ability to intercept VRS communication. Butleranswered these questions by testifying to the Tribunal that the tape recordings of the intercepted VRSradio communications were credible. He admitted that he too was sceptical at first but had laterreviewed his assessment. Butler stated that he had listened to 80-90% of the militarily relevant radiotraffic and had studied thousands of documents. It appeared to him from the intercept protocols thatpeople were speaking openly over the radio about the mass murder of the Muslims from Srebrenica.Two men whom Butler could not identify spoke about 10,000 Muslims of military age who had fled.‘Have we halved them yet? Four or five thousand must be dead by now.’1384 Another expert, who wascalled in by the prosecutor at the Yugoslavia Tribunal, also judged the intercepts as authentic. 1385Orders issued by Krstic and other conversations about ‘parcels’ were also registered. On 17 Julya message was intercepted about ‘A huge human mass of about 5,000 concentrated around Cerska andKamenica, so many you can’t kill them all’. When Krstic, in an intercepted conversation with anunidentified person, asked who had issued orders to send soldiers to a specific place, he was told thatthe orders had come from the General Staff. This implied that the General Staff was directly involvedin leading the operations. Intercepted calls indicated that the VRS also had ‘secure lines’. However,although the VRS did have secure means of sending messages, the Tribunal heard evidence that thesesystems were not always functional and that often unsecured lines were used for expediency. Inaddition, secured communications took much longer to prepare and send. 1386 The 2 nd Corps hadascertained this earlier after a military operation around Zepa. Two VRS soldiers who were killed in thisoperation had documents on them which revealed that calls were being made to Han Pijesak via fixedtelephone lines from barracks to the north of Zepa. The documents listed the direct telephonenumbers of Mladic, Gvero, Milovanovic and other generals. 1387It can safely be concluded that the Sigint units of the ABiH were highly capable. This is alsoevident from the tape recording of the (disputed) intercepted conversation in which the former1382 Mehmed Pargan, ‘B-H Army Eavesdropped on VRS’, Sarajevo Slobodna Bosna (FBIS translation), 11/07/98.1383 Confidential information (38).1384 Judgement in the Krstic Trial, § 115, p. 23 and Butler, Testimony 5107. See also: ‘Verslagen afgeluisterde tapes zeergeloofwaardig’ (Reports of monitored tapes highly credible), in: ANP Press release, 18/07/00 and ‘Tapes val Srebrenica zijnzeer geloofwaardig’ (Tapes on fall of Srebrenica higly credible), METRO, 19/07/00.1385 Judgement in the Krstic Trial, § 114, p. 42.1386 See for example: ICTY (IT-98-33) D 66a, 28 th Division to 2 nd Corps, Weekly Morale Report, no. 04-113/95, 30/06/95.See for all intercepts: Coll. NIOD, ICTY, OTP Ex. 738, List of Exhibits contained in Ex. 364 (2 volumes of Intercepts). Forthe existence of the special secured connections: Intercept 17 July/12/ii.1387 NIOD, Coll. CD-Roms. 285 th Brigade, Zepa to General Staff ABiH, no. 08-13-52/95, 17/05/95.